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TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
UNDER THE JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT PARTY (AKP)
GOVERNMENT

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Izmir, 2014

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this Master's thesis titled as "Turkish Foreign Policy toward Sub-Saharan Africa under the Justice and Development Party (AKP) Government" has been written by myself in accordance with the academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that all materials benefited in this thesis consist of the mentioned resourses in the reference list. I verify all these with my honour.

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ABSTRACT

Master Thesis

TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA UNDER THE JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT PARTY (AKP) GOVERNMENT

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Since the AKP came to power in 2002 Turkey's foreign policy has seen tremendous changes characterized by the expansion of its diplomatic relations with the parts of the world including the Sub-Saharan Africa that had already been neglected by former administrations. The aim of this study is to explore the governing premises, strategies and goals of the Turkish foreign policy towards the region. These elements are elaborated and defined by employing three different perspectives, or levels, by bringing to the fore the factors relevant to international system, Turkish state and Turkish policy makers. At the individual level the changing mindset of the Turkish policy makers that encourage and steer them to pursue more dynamic foreign policy is unfolded. At the state level, the study tries to put forth the domestic political, economic and ideological changes that gave impetus to the expansion of the Turkey's interest to formerly ignored geographies of the world. At the systemic level, this study discusses political, security and cultural developments at the global scale influencing Turkish Republic's position in international politics.

Keywords: Turkey, Sub-Saharan Africa, Foreign Policy, AKP

OZET

Yüksek Lisans Tezi

ADALET VE KALKINMA PARTİSİ (AKP) YÖNETİMİNDE SAHRA ALTI AFRİKAYA YÖNELİK TÜRK DIŞ POLİTİKASI

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AKP'nin 2002'de iktidara gelmesiyle birlikte Türk dış politikası önemli değişimler geçirmiş, Sahra Altı Afrika gibi daha önceki yönetimlerin ilgi göstermediği dünyanın diğer bölgeleriyle diplomatic ilişkiler kurulmuştur. Bu çalışmanın amacı bu bölgeye yönelik Türk dış politikasının temel prensiplerini, stratejilerini ve amaçlarını ortaya koymaktır. Bu unsurlar üç farklı perspektif ya daha açıkça, uluslararası sistem, Türk devleti ve Türk karar alıcılar düzeyinde ele alınmakta ve analiz edilmektedir. Sistem düzeyinde, bu çalışma Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin uluslararası siyasettte konumunu etkileyen küresel ölçekli siyasal, ekonomik ve kültürel gelişmeleri ele almaktadır. Devlet düzeyinde ise, çalışma Türk devletinin dünyanın daha once ihmal edilmiş coğrafyalarına ilgisini arttıran iç siyasal, ekonomik ve ideolojik değişmeleri ortaya koymaktadır. Bireysel düzeyde Türk devlet adamlarını daha dinamik bir dış siyaset izlemeye cesaretlendiren ve sevkeden zihniyet değişimine değinilmektedir.

Anahtar kelimeler: Türkiye, Sahra Altı Afrika, Dış Politika,

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

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ABBREVIATIONS

A K P – Adalet ve Kalkinma Partsi

A U – African Union

ACAUM – African Research and Information Centre

ANAP – Anavatan Partisi

BBC – British Broadcasting Corporation

BRICS – Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa

CTF – Combine Task Force

E AC – East African Community

E U – European Union

ECOWAS – Economic Community of West African States

FTA – Free Trade Agreement

IGAD – Inter-governmental Authority on Development Partners Forum

IMF – International Monetary Fund

LDCs – Least Developed Countries

MENA – Middle East and North Africa

MHP – Milliyetci Hareket Partisi

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NGOs – Non Governmental Organization

OECD – Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

OIC – Organization of Islamic Conference

PKK – Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan

TFG – Transitional Federal Government

TIKA – Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency

TOBB – Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges

TUSKON – Turkish Confederation of Business and Industrialists

U N - United Nations

UACCIAP – Union of African Chambers of Commerce, Industry, Agriculture and Profession

UNSC – United Nations Security Council

W F P – World Food Programme

WHO – World Health Organization

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INTRODUCTION

Sub-Saharan Africa is the area in the continent of Africa that is geographically located south of the Sahara Desert. It is also called Africa South of the Sahara, and consists of forty eight independent states that are fully or partially located in the region. It contrasts with North Africa, which is considered a part of the Arab world. The North Africa is predominantly Arab and relatively developed, many residents identify more with the Middle East than they do with the larger part of the continent. Somalia, Djibouti, Comoros and Mauritania are geographically part of Sub-Saharan Africa, but also part of the Arab world (Dixon, 2012 and BBC 23/1/2004). However, when it comes to an African identity some Sub-Saharan Africans have the belief of more claims to the continent than their Northern counterpart.

Geographically, Sub-Saharan Africa can be divided into five regions: West, Central, South, East and the Horn of Africa. Therefore, when we discuss Turkish foreign policy towards Africa one can speak of two types of Turkish conceptions of Africa: North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa. These conceptions should be taken into consideration, with regard to Turkey's relations with North Africa, as it was a part of the Ottoman Empire dating back to fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, while relations with Sub-Saharan Africa are a more recent one, dating back to the nineteenth century. Therefore, since the times of the Ottomans North Africa is part of the Turkish periphery and also considered as part of broader Middle East, it's an area that the current Turkish society feels closer to too (Ozkan, 2012:95). In this study the concepts of Sub-Saharan Africa and Africa will be used interchangeably, since in the Turkish foreign policy psyche these two concepts are the same and different from North Africa.

Research Question and Methodology

The inadequate literature on Turkey and Sub-Saharan Africa relations and between the individual countries of the region is one of the motivations behind the selection of Turkish foreign policy towards the Sub-Saharan Africa. Recently, there are increasing interests of Turkey by AKP led-government and its new policy makers to reach out to the far away and neglected territories and regions including Sub-Saharan Africa. Here, it should be emphasized that, the relations between the Turkish and Sub-Saharan African sides are not engineered by a single factor and it should be noted that the foreign policy interest of a country is a dynamic process and the desire to maintain such relations depends on the vision of the policy makers and their national preference.

Within the study, the Turkish foreign policy will be analyzed through a detailed analysis of major elements in foreign policy decisions. It seems since earlier times of the republic there was unwillingness from the foreign policy makers' elite to diversify Turkish relations; rather they limited their potential to only the Western bloc. Since the AKP began to pursue a more diversified Turkish foreign policy an important portion of Africa rather than solely Northern Africa has gained importance in the eyes of the Turkish policy makers as a result. This study aims at bringing to the fore the fundamentals of the Turkish foreign policy towards the region. What the author has employed to be used for this aim are the classical foreign policy analysis techniques based on the employment of three levels of analysis; i.e. individual, state and system levels.

The first chapter discusses the arguments related to how a given country analyse its foreign policy through individual, state and systemic perspectives. The chapter is designed in a way to demonstrate how the factors that can be categorized individual, statial, and systemic play a decisive role in the transformation of the foreign policy of the given country. The second

chapter talks about the analysis of the Turkish foreign policy in general manner by employing the parameters that foreign policy analysis approach recommends. In other words, it talks about Turkish foreign policy in terms of continuities and changes which are to be elaborated through systemic shift in balance of power, domestic political, economic and cultural changes that are assumed to have given impetus to its transformation, and policy makers' perceptions on the location and capabilities of the Turkish state. The third chapter focus solely on the Turkey-Sub-Saharan Africa relations under the guidance of the theoretical parameters of foreign policy analysis approach, the Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu's view and vision regarding the strategic place of the region and the ways to develop relations in the regional states and its economic boom and liberalization enabling civil society organizations to incorporate themselves in the process of decision making and lastly by assigning space to the systemic changes that allow Turkey to reconceptualise its location and role in the world politics.

Within the context of this study, the author used several secondary resources, including books, articles, book chapters, journals, newspapers, internet sources, unpublished thesis and other relevant materials. These secondary resources are mostly qualitative and include both the theoretical writings on foreign policy analysis. It should be noted that as the case of all social science the information and sources could be shaped by personal ideas of the authors. However, this is not applicable to our case alone since all social science suffer from the difficulty or impossibility of finding the actual truth. The primary sources such as official the websites of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, governmental and non-governmental organizations, the Turkish statistical institutes were also used. They also include quantitative data.

Hence, the study, in eclectic manner, tried to bring together in a meaningful form the factors that seem to be a playing decisive role in Turkey opening to the Sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, this study claims that;

- The visions of the Davutoglu in the strategic depth doctrine and the AKP new foreign policy principles may relatively have helped in building Turkey-Sub-Saharan Africa relations.

- Domestic determinants have been successful in the opening of Turkish foreign policy towards Sub-Saharan Africa, but it could be better off with the factors of international environment.

- Changes in the international environment and factors from the system contributes in luring Turkish foreign policy makers' attention to Sub-Saharan Africa, but the role played by individual and domestic factors can't be ruled out.

- All the factors of the three level of analysis have played considerable positive and constructive role in the Turkey and Sub-Saharan Africa relations.

CHAPTER ONE

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: A THREE LEVEL FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS

The explanation of foreign policy analysis is complex and diverse, because it involves an explanation of multiple factors. Many analysts (Kaarbo, etal, 2012:7) recognized that any explanation of foreign policy typically involves many different factors. These multiple factors can be group into two categories of explanations: external and internal factors. The first categories are factors that often influence the foreign policy of state in the international environment. This means that how international system is organised, the actors involve, the interactions they make, and the actions and policies they decide can lead the state to react and makes policies in certain ways. The second category points to the factors internal to the state. This means that, the domestic political system, citizens and groups, within that system, and the leaders serve as the source of a state's foreign policy.

Contrary, to the understanding of Kaarbo etal., on the way to explain and analyse foreign policy, Neack (2003:8) emphasizes the need to glance at the foreign policy analysis of a state, using three levels of analysis. These levels of analysis are: individual level of analysis, state level of analysis and system level of analysis. The individual level focuses on individual decision makers, the roles they play, the perceptions they hold and the ways decision makers interact in small and top level groups. The state level focuses on societal and governmental factors that contribute to the making of foreign policy in a state. The system level focuses on state to state relations in regional and global issues in the international system.

Breuning (2007:11) also captured the importance of explaining foreign policy analysis by the concept of levels of analysis. These three levels of analysis correspond to the different foci of foreign policy analysis. Individuals ponder options and make decisions, state engages in

foreign policy behaviours, and interaction between states in the international system yields outcomes. Moreover, this means, in explaining foreign policy analysis, we should examine three levels of analysis in foreign policy making. Although, these levels of analysis are quite different from one another, because the factors in each one differed, and each is operating at different stage, as we will see later. Interestingly, all the levels are complimented to one another, as far as foreign policy analysis is concern.

1.1. Individual level of Analysis

The mind of a foreign policy maker is not a tabula rasa. It contains complex and intricately related information and patterns (Hudson, 2005:10). This involves the understanding how human decision making process leads to policy making, and focuses on leaders and decision makers in an effort to explain foreign policy. The analysis of individual focuses on many multiple factors that influence the policy maker's decisions (Breuning, 2007:12). These factors that do influence foreign policy decisions of a leader are: cognitive, perception, psychology, beliefs system, emotions, rationality, orientation and so on and so forth.

The analysis of individual leaders might focus on their personality, how they make sense of their world and events occurring within it. This leads to the study of their personality traits, beliefs system, values and character (Breuning, 2007:13). Therefore, by looking into these we will be able to know what motivates a leader to arrive at one decision or the other. Mintz and DeRouen (2007:114) defined personality as the individually patterned integration of processes of perception, memory, judgement, goal-seeking, and emotional expression and regulation. This definition will help us to understand how and why some leaders make certain decisions completely different from, while they are facing similar situation.

However, personality can provide analysts with insightful explanations as to why certain decisions were reached, and allow predictions to be made regarding foreign policy decision

making (Smith, 2012:4). This means that by examining the personal characteristics and idiosyncratic characteristics, prediction can be made on the likely foreign policy decision making because such examinations can create a clear picture of likely personal behaviour. As part of personality of a leader Mintz and DeRouen (2007) emphasized that "beliefs" provide powerful frames for interpreting and understanding the decision situation. Beliefs may block and shape incoming information. The influence of domestic and international factors on decision making is mediated by the beliefs of leaders. This means that beliefs are what shape how leaders processes information, uses and formulate decisions strategies. If leader's beliefs block any incoming information, this will prevent them from receiving and updating their mental models in accordance with new information. Layddjiev (2011:3) added to this argument, the influence of personal belief and of neoconservative ideas can also be observed in the actual decision making process. A leader that assumes the position of predominant leader, who has little to guide him in foreign policy apart from his own belief schema, may have had long term belief to have operated under inherent bad faith model, which will block any new incoming information that can alter his existing beliefs.

Another important factor that often influence foreign policy decision maker is "perception." According to Rourke (2005:76) perception play a key role in policy because they form an operational reality. That is policy makers tend to act based on perception, whether they are accurate or not. That is to say, the individual perception or the process through which leaders make sense of events or situation is specifically determine by their inner understanding to that situation or event. He further stressed that a related perceptual phenomenon is called an operational code; this idea describes how any given leader's world view and philosophical propensities for choosing rewards, threats, force and other methods of diplomacy as the best way to be successful.

Unlike Rourke, Layddjiev (2011:6) viewed operational code from the angle of belief system, which contains both general philosophical beliefs nature of politics, conflicts, history e.t.c and instrumental beliefs about causal relationships and strategies of achieving objectives. This approach highlights the importance of the image of opponent and suggests that beliefs are a way of defining the situation and picking a strategy perceived as suitable. Although, both scholars differed on how they explain what operational code is, but they both converge at the same meaning of how decision makers view influence their perception in achieving the stated objectives. This clearly brings out how perception is shaping foreign policy decision and how decisions makers view the world through perceptual lenses that distort reality at least to some degree.

Cognitive factor, according to Rourke (2005:72) has great influence on the ideas and thinking of the individual decision maker. This means making decision within the constraints of bounded rationality. The limited physical stamina and intellectual capacity to study exceptionally complex issues, decision makers tend to seek cognitive consistency by discounting ideas and information that contradict their existing views. This means that individual leaders tend be self-convinced about any decision they make and ignore any information which they understand contrary to what they hold in their mine. This is what exactly captured by Festinger's concept of "cognitive dissonance," which explained how decision makers can and deliberately remove and exclude information that is contradictory or that does not conform with their own ideas, regardless of the merits of that information. In fact, when presented with contradictory or that does not conform to their own ideas, regardless of the merits of that information. In fact, when presented with contradictory information, decision makers actually strengthen their initial beliefs.

According to Breuning (2007:4) leaders are often rational human beings who want to make best or good foreign policy decisions for their countries. Therefore, the goals of the policy

must be stated and examined thoroughly, objectives and importance of the policy should be known and defined clearly and the policy options should be brought into paper to see which will best serve and yield the desired outcomes. Additionally, and even more importantly rationality does not guarantee a desirable outcome, because the outcome is in part dependent on the reactions of other actors. Rourke (2005:76) explores that human decisions are also a mix of rational and irrational input. This view of how individuals and groups make policy choices is called "poliheuristic theory." According to him this theory depicts decision making as a two stage process. During the first stage, decision makers use shortcuts to eliminate policy options that unacceptable for irrational personal reasons. With the unacceptable choices discarded the process moves to a second stage, during which the decision maker uses some analytic processing in an attempt to minimize risks and maximize benefits in a more rational way. It is at this second stage that decision makers tend to set aside domestic politics and personal factors and concentrate on strategic, real-politik considerations.

As an individual decision maker, emotions can certainly influence individual leader in making decisions. Emotions play a role in decision. Extreme emotions such as fear or anger can make it difficult for decision makers to be objective and choose appropriate policy option. Emotions can also have more positive role. Love, sympathy and empathy are all important influences on decision making. Emotions are known to influence how leaders process information and the importance they assign to various dimension in emotionally loaded situation versus emotionally neutral one (Mintz and DeRouen, 2010:100). Moreover, Loh (2013:3) emphasized that, despite emotions plays an indubitable role in the decision making process, studies have shown also that it precedes and even shapes choice. All these depend on what kinds of emotions a play maker finds himself in, fear and angry emotions may leads a policy maker towards quick decision which may in turn result to wrong outcome. While sympathy and love, may lead to decision maker towards leniency and subsequently can

find himself in not doing the right things. Therefore, there is possibility that emotions actually contribute to better and wrong decisions respectively.

Hermann etal. (1997:20) examined the influence of orientation to the leader's view on foreign policy making. By orientation to foreign affairs it is meant the leader's view about how government should act in the foreign policy arena. An orientation defines the leaders' view of his own nation's and other nation's positions and roles in the world, and it presupposes a specific political style in dealing with foreign policy problems. Some leaders use their orientation in order to well defined world issues and view those through their oriented view and use it to interpret incoming information before they make foreign policy decision. Furthermore, some leaders' orientation lead him to be sensitive others' opinions and incoming information. The sensitive leader is the one who wants to confirm and ascertain where other leaders stand on a particular issue before he moves to make his foreign policy decision making. In short, knowing a leader's personality will enable us to predict what his government's foreign policy choice will be likely. But if the leader is more sensitive knowing his personality will not be enough to provide us with the likely foreign policy choice of his government. We need also to find some information about the aspect of political system, personal data will not be enough to give us the hints.

Group interaction or "groupthink" are often classified as individual level of analysis because the focus tends to be on understanding the dynamics of interpersonal interaction rather than on the group as an undifferentiated unit. According to Garrison (2005:178) in this scenario, individuals with diverse parochial goals, beliefs, and motives complete for influence as the work to overcome their opposition. When officials with influence differ on how they want problems resolved, bargaining results. Although compromise decisions are the assumed outcome, they do not always occur. This is because the concept denotes pressure within the organizations to achieve consensus by agreeing with the prevailing opinion, especially the

view of the leader. This shows that in group interaction other members are symbolic because only the view and opinion of a leader are considered, other members opinion is excluded and disregarded.

Psychology is as important as other factors in shaping the leaders foreign policy decision making. The psychological traits of an individual, developed not just as a result of political education but due to other long standing environmental influence leaders' predisposition lead to misperceptions which affect policy. Therefore, psychology develops within long range of time and is shaped by the societal factors such as the culture, values and how leader was raised since from his childhood. It is argued that the goals of policy makers are influenced by their background that is their societal background, and the generation to which they belong. Because, the defining political or foreign policy events of the period when an individual comes of political age are said to shape that individuals' views of the politics and foreign policy ever after (McEvoy-Levy, 2001:17).

Furthermore, psychology can affect foreign policy in number of ways and at a number of different stages in the policy-making process. Because, it is also part of the idiosyncratic characteristics of individual, the way he interacts with his fellow human and how he often views the world around him. Each leader's personal characteristics shape his or her decisions. Therefore in this individual level of analysis we understand that, leaders have numerous and multiple factors that shape their mind and thinking when engage in foreign policy making. It is difficult, to explain foreign policy decisions and behaviour without reference to leaders. The successful conducts of foreign relations depend on the foreign policy skills of individuals.

1.2. State Level of Analysis

This level of analysis emphasizes the characteristics of states and how they make foreign policy choices and implement them. What is important from this perspective, then, is how a country's political structure and the political forces and sub-national actors within the country cause its government to decide to adopt one or another foreign policy (Rourke, 2005:78). This shows that leaders almost always face domestic constraints on foreign policy making. Therefore, policy options must not only respond appropriately to the situation, they must also be acceptable at home. Thus, in evaluating policy options a country's decision makers must consider not only whether such options constitute effective and appropriate response to the situation and circumstances. They must also evaluate and analyze how such decisions will be viewed by the sub national actors within such states (Breuning, 2007:116).

The state level of analysis consists of multiple factors and sub-actors that is governmental and non-governmental organizations that influence the foreign policy decision of a state, and these factors shape the policy actions of leaders in one policy or another. They include bureaucracies, civil societies, role of media, political culture, the types of government, public opinion and the legislatures. The types of government could be considered as the background of all the remaining factors. Because it depend on what type of government in place that will determine the extent at which each one of these factors can influence states' foreign policy decisions. Democratic government provide conducive atmosphere to some degree for these factors to have great and significant influence, while authoritarian regime gives very little if any opportunity to these factors to play a significant role.

In democratic societies, the public has more avenues formally available to express dissent. The degree to such opinion is expressed, as well as the degree to which it constrains decision makers depend on both institutional and societal factors. The structure of political institution

is more open to societal influence in democratic government. Open institutional structures provide greater access and more contact points for interest groups and societal actors and hence more opportunity to influence decision making (Breuning, 2007:122). Though, Rourke (2005:79) argued that the more authoritarian a government is, the more likely it is that foreign policy will be centred in a narrow segment of the government, mostly in the hand of the leader. But, because state are too big, too complex, to him, no government is therefore absolutely under thumb of any individual. Secondary leaders such as foreign ministers, bureaucrats, interest groups and other domestic element play a role in the foreign policy decisions even in the authoritarian regime.

The point raised by Rourke is ambiguous, because in the authoritarian regime even if in the eyes of the public foreign ministers, bureaucrats and other internal actors are playing a role in the foreign policy decision their role is symbolic. Because is only what the leader consider and view as the best foreign policy option are recognised and put into effect, any policy that contradict his personal view and perception as well as his belief will not be taking into consideration, hence, disregarded and ignored. Breuning (2005:121) explain that, authoritarian governments provide very few, if any, avenues for citizens to explicitly influence foreign policy. If any is likely to be indirect or implied; citizens can not join interest groups, the media are often not free. Despite this, leaders in such societies do seek to understand their public, if only because this helps them stay in power. They present foreign policy problems and decisions in terms of verbal imagery that they believe will resonate with their domestic audience and they, too, try to convince their domestic audience that their policies are in the national interest, as defined by the leader.

Another important factor which is related to the types of government is how public opinion influence states foreign policy decisions. Mintz and DeRouen (2010: 32) viewed public opinion influence on foreign policy at the time of war or crisis. According to them, public

opinion about a crisis may influence the use of force, escalation, termination and other foreign policy decisions. Despite many citizens of a state does not necessarily follow what kind of foreign policy their government will employ on some foreign issues. But during war public become aware of what their country state is, therefore certain internal pressures applied to national leaders sometimes compel them to consider public opinion in deciding their policy options.

Scholars continue to debate the impact of public opinion on foreign policy decisions even in the highly democratized states in which policy supposedly reflects the will of the people (Kaarbo, 2012:14). Yet even in democracies, the public usually plays only a limited role in determining foreign policy. One reason for the public's limited role is that few citizens ordinarily pay much attention to international issues. This is not to say all public pay little attention to foreign policy decisions all the time, there are attentive public particularly on crisis issues and policy that is concern with both international and domestic affairs. Rourke (2005:8) gives classic example of this policy; foreign trade because it affect both international relations and domestic economy in terms of jobs, prices and other factors. Therefore, national leaders such as president do not have greater say on this type of policy compared to pure foreign policy. Most research on public opinion as a source of foreign policy has focused on democracies, because both appointed and elected officials are concern with the public opinion. This is especially when the public is clearly attentive to an issue, because they believe that public opinion is legitimate under democracy, they are also concern with after effect from the public in the next election if they ignored majority opinion.

The vital functions and responsibilities of bureaucracy in any types of government make it undeniably important in the foreign policy decisions making. According to Kaarbo (2012:15) bureaucracy is charged with gathering information, developing proposals, offering advice, implementing policy, and, at times, making foreign policy decisions. This due to the complex

responsibilities of government in dealing with multiple issues, it organized how to handle and administer its responsibilities by assigning responsibilities bureaucratically to different and separate agencies and departments. For example, those responsible for trade, international diplomatic relations. Ultimately, every state whatever its strength or type of government is heavily influenced by its bureaucracy (Rourke, 2005:85). Although, political leaders constitutionally give order to the bureaucracy, they often find it hard to exert a total control to the vast under-structures of their governments. Sometimes the intended policy doesn't necessarily get translated throughout the levels of government intransigence, so there is bureaucratic threat. At times bureaucrats do not follow their assigned responsibilities diligently and find themselves in different policy understanding with their leader's beliefs and choice, instead they may favour another option based on their general sense.

Furthermore, for the leaders depend on them for information, bureaucrats sometimes provide information that can only please the leader, not necessarily the best one. Bureaucrats can also narrow the range of options available to leaders by presenting to them only those options they favour, therefore, decided what leaders would do even before they considered a situation. They can also influence policy by the way they carry it out. Sometimes problems will be noted but even those that need considerable attention are ignored (Rourke, 2005:86).

It can be argued that in many countries around the world the decision making process involves not only the political leaders alone but, there exist sometimes the influence of states elites. These state elites are the group of powerful and influential people, politically and economically. They constitute an elites circle from which they use their personalities to influence government foreign policy decisions. However, these groups of elites maybe more important and instrumental in defining foreign policy goals and priorities compared to general public. Gvalia etal., (2011:23) argue that although we do not devalue the role of public opinion, we assume that elite's opinion largely shapes and influence foreign policy

agenda, whereas public opinion sets the bounds of what is acceptable. The state elites and policy makers often have shared opinion and complex political belief and value systems, which are usually more coherent and logically consistent than those of ordinary individuals. Therefore, elite's attitudes towards states foreign policy makers are likely to have much more influence when making policy decisions and to have immediate bearing on state behaviour than those of general public.

Meanwhile, leaders may be more likely to pay attention in order to react to the opinions of specific organised interest and civil society groups as well as non-governmental organisations domestically than to the society at large. Although these organizations and groups represent states humanity and also operate within state territory, they play the role of linking society to the state or of opposing to and competing with the state. The interest groups for example, are of many types such as, the cultural groups, economic groups and political groups. Traditionally, interest groups were generally considered to be less active and influential on foreign policy than on domestic policy issues. But globalization and liberalization trends have certainly increased the influence of economic groups such a way as to move their interest to the agenda of their state's foreign policy (Kaarbo, 2012:15).

An interest group's influence on foreign policy often depends on the particular issue, how organized the group is and relationship between the interest group and the government. Although, all types of interest groups has only one major tools to influence state's foreign policy decision, that is by lobbying their government for what they consider the best policy options. Notwithstanding sometimes they engage in organizing conventions, rallies, campaigning through media in order to directly or indirectly express their views on the foreign policy issue at the stake.

The political culture of a given country is major factor when explaining domestic influence on foreign policy decisions of such country. To analyse any country's political culture, you would look into such things as how people feel about themselves and their country, how they view others, what role they think their country should play in the world and what they see moral. Each country's foreign policy tends to reflect its political culture. Leaders tend to formulate policies that are compatible with their society's culture because the leaders share many or all of those values (Rourke, 2005:80). Other scholars like Breuning (2005:127) adds that there are differences in the way the citizens of different countries view the world. This is true also for decision makers, who are products of their societies as well as representatives of their societies. Both citizens and decision makers have been shaped by their culture, upbringing and education. Both may have lesser greater awareness of the extent to which their understanding of history and international affairs is culturally determined. However, even if they do not share a particular value, leaders want to avoid the backlash that adopting policies counter to the political culture might cause.

Despite, in all countries legislatures play a lesser role in making foreign policy decision compared to executive and bureaucracy. This does not mean that legislatures are powerless when explaining domestic influence on foreign policy decision. Legislatures in democratic country play more significant roles than in undemocratic one (Rourke, 2005:87). But even in the democratic countries their influence remains significant at the time of war. As long as a country is under democracy, leaders does not have extensive legal powers to engage their countries in war without the majority approval of their legislative, as happened in the similar realms such as signing treaties, diplomacy and recognition of other countries whereby a leader have legal constitutional power to act and makes policy decisions without the necessary approval of the legislature.

A consensus has emerged among political communication scholars that in the public sphere the media are the most important public forum and central mediating actor between political decision-makers and the public (Schulz, 2013:4). Media is vital for the examination and deliberation of foreign policy process, the decision makers are often aware of the effect of media and therefore formulate policies that will not possibly backfire when they reach the public ears. An independent and autonomous media is essential for this responsibility, in order to avoid government propaganda and leaders manipulation of the media to serve their personal interest. Therefore, the influence of the media on foreign policy decision has consequences on policy making process.

1.3. System Level of Analysis

Breuning (2007: 13) defined international system as a set of states whose interactions are guided by their relative capabilities, such as their power and wealth, which influence their possibilities for action and for success on the global stage. This level focuses on comparison and interaction between states, and asks question about relative power of state. Additionally, in the systemic level countries can lose and also gain power. This means that, there are often changes that may arise in favour or against states, these changes can be an emboldenment to other and can also be a constraints to some. Either of the two has an influence on the actions and foreign policy decision of a state in the international environment.

Systemic level is a top down approach to world politics that examines the socio-economic-political-geographic characteristics of the system and how they influence the actions of countries and other actors. In this, countries may be theoretically free to make any foreign policy decision they want, but as practical matter, achieving a successful foreign policy requires that they make choices that are reasonable within the context of the realities of the international system (Rourke, 2005:89). The international environment is unpredictable,

complex and ever changing. Any move by one country is watchful by another and the pattern of attraction may change across time as a country's capabilities changes, concomitantly this may create opportunities for that country in the international system.

The conduct of the international system is heavily influenced by power consideration such as the number of powerful actors and the context of power. Countries are therefore, restrained by the realities of power in the international systems. The system consists of different power poles. The number of power poles in existence at any time helps determine how countries are likely to act. The relationships that exist among the actors in a particular type of international system structure vary because of the number of powerful actors, the relative power of each, and the permitted interactions within the system (Rourke, 2005:93). By the end of World War II the multi polar international system characterised by the pursuit of the balance of power among great powers, in a way that none of them was strong enough to predominate over others, transformed into bipolarity. The bipolar world was dominated by two opposite great powers with strong economic, military and cultural influences on their allies (Varisco, 2013:13).

Before and during the Cold War era, we witnessed the international system whereby two dominant world super powers, the United States and former Soviet Union dominated the system. The rivalry between these two countries emanated from their political and economic ideological differences that greatly distinguished them from each other. But with the collapse of the Soviet Union eventually the Cold War era came to an end. The international system changed from bipolarity to unipolarity as the United States stand as the only world super power. Interestingly, the world is again witnessing another dramatic change in the international environment, with the rise of some new regional powers that now have a significant level of influence in the system. The rise of China, India, Brazil, Turkey and South Africa for instance, greatly influence and affect the conduct of power politics in the

international environment. Consequently, this influences how states in the system will pursue their foreign policy interest. This point direct to a complex and curious relationship between a shifting global distribution of power and the changing nature in the world order.

Stephen (2011:24) emphasizes that the rising regional powers are seen as challenging the legitimacy of the existing world order and favouring a more multi-polar and pluralistic system. Therefore, the balancing perspective emerges most clearly in the domain of security, which is often assumed the most fundamental goal of regional super powers and that their power capabilities will determine their foreign policy options. This means that to some scholars the world is now moving towards multipolar system, whereby the unilateral power of United States faces challenges from the rising super powers, especially from China with the rapid and superb economic and military capabilities. Undoubtedly, China is posing both economic and military challenges to United States and has to hold on relative economic challenges from the other BRICS countries.

Furthermore, to become regional power, is to be militarily, economically and politically strong over the remaining countries in that specific region. But sometimes it is a struggle for power among competing actors. Therefore, in conduct of foreign policy power play a vital role among nations. Sempa (2002:87) identifies that the struggle for survival and the improvement of the relative power position become the primary objective of the internal and external policy of states. All else is secondary, because in the last instance only power can achieve the objective of foreign policy in the international environment. That is why many argue that, it is hard to accept that norms exist in a world system whereby the powerful country acted according to their wish and disregard and exclude absolutely anything that contradict or become obstacle on their way of maximizing powers they possessed.

The geographical location of a country is among the major determinant of that country on making foreign policy decisions in the systemic level. According to founder of geopolitics Mackinder, the geographical realities of the planet presented the opportunity for a sufficiently organised and armed great power to control the world's pivot region, the northern central core of Eurasia and subsequently, establish a world empire. However, geopolitical concepts do not provide statesmen with specific policy prescriptions, setting forth when it is appropriate to use such tools as military force, economic and military assistance, or convert operations, let alone determining the means and content of diplomacy with allies and adversaries. Rather geopolitical concepts offer a global framework within which both grand strategy and specific policies can be formulated and implemented (Sempa, 2002:90).

The central argument is that, the strategic geographical location will be taken into consideration by foreign policy makers. Some countries are strategically and geographically located where they could be consulted or sought their assistance on some international decision making. Land or sea powers considered to be the greatest for a country. Sempa also developed a philosophy of sea power which focused on six fundamental national factors; geographical position, physical conformation, extent of territory, population, national character and governmental institutions. He believed that with a sufficient land base, sea power, a country's foreign policy will have an upper hand especially in the time of war and this will become a guiding principle in its policy making.

Vinha (2012:9) and Brzezinski (cited by Sempa, 2002: 91) viewed the geographical location from the security perspective and greater power status. They explained that the size of national territory also remains one of the major criteria for status and power. Although, many factors contribute to great power status, geography determines whether a country has the prerequisites of great power status. Therefore, the national security elite use geography to define dilemmas of international politics in particular ways.

In the international paradigm transnational non-governmental organisation (NGOs) operates at international level alongside intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) ensuring that issues are put on the agenda instead of being ignored, increasing more adversity to the policy making process and monitoring the gap between governmental eloquence and governmental practice in the policy making. Kim (2001:14) provides two types of relationship between states and transnational NGOs; either top-down or bottom-up relationship. In top-down relationship, states tend to influence NGOs by providing resources and controlling available funding. While, the bottom-up relationship view NGOs decision making runs independently from states. Therefore, depending on the types of government, NGOs have different ways of influence over state's decision. They do so in order to achieve the mission and goals of theirs. For example, a growing network of environmental NGOs, such as Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth, works to hold governments accountable to international environment standards.

While some transnational NGOs have sought to engage more directly with governments in order to exercise more influence over other policies. Some work closely with individual government, and acting as advisors to governmental agencies, liaising with government institutions, thereby acquiring a voice within policy making institutions. Some for instance, contributed to international policy debates by producing codes of conduct and quasi-legal solution to problems that draw on existing intergovernmental treaties (Collingwood, 2006:455). On the other hand, international governmental organizations (IGOs) and regional organizations become another way through which states implement their foreign policy decisions outside their territory. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, we witnessed the proliferation of many regional and international governmental organizations in the Eastern and Central Europe in lieu with increase in new independent states. The proliferations of these regional organizations and IGOs increases greatly the complexity of the international

system and this forces the existing states particularly the members of IGOs to adjust and reshape their role and foreign policy decisions making in the international environment.

Therefore, Berg (no date: 3) added that international governmental organizations often try to influence set direction of, or maintain government policies. In fact governments increasingly enlist IGOs to coordinate some of their cooperation efforts contributing funds and administrative functions. This means they are supranational organizations, in which states give some of their sovereignty when they consent to abide by agreements which made them member of the organization. Many believed that sovereignty is declining and that even the most powerful states are subject to a growing number of authoritative rules made by intergovernmental organizations and by international law. However, many times the IGOs apply sanctions, embargoes, or boycott to compel states to do something that they otherwise would have not refrained from doing or to prevent them from doing things that they would have otherwise done. Moreover, IGOs transcend countries borders and can have a major impact on the governmental foreign policy making. They also exert influence and impose limit on member's policies and the way in which those policies are made in the international system, thereby compelling governments to take positions on international issues.

Since Joseph Nye popularised the concept of soft power in early years of the Cold War era, its discussions has deepened in the context of international system and countries are using it in the system. According to Nye (2004:30) soft power is the ability to get what you want by attracting and persuading others to adopt your goals. It differs from hard power, the ability to use the carrots and sticks of economic and military might to make others follow your will. Although, a country might posses a great sum of hard and soft power capabilities, yet might be unable to have an influence on foreign policy strategies and behaviours of other actors. Capabilities do not automatically translate into influence. Many countries use foreign aid as an instrument of soft power in order to pursue their interest within the international

environment. Foreign aid therefore, remains a tool used by big and powerful countries in order to influence the foreign policies of the recipient countries. It comes in two forms; economic or humanitarian and military aid. The world super powers use this strategy to influence certain foreign policies interest and are more generous if the recipient countries complied effectively. Humanitarian factors do not significantly influence whether and how much foreign aid is provided by donor states. Rather the foreign policy interests of the donor are an important factor that causes the donors to provide foreign aid.

Soft power also often helps to prepares fertile ground to foreign policy makers for good negotiation and enhance the country's capability in promoting effective international engagements. The culture of a country is part of its soft power that can be attractive to others, particularly the understandings of natural history and national narrative, play a huge role in shaping national ambitions and how nations established their priorities and to a lesser extent how they manage their policy prescriptions both at home and abroad. Therefore, a country with culturally shared values, historical experience as well as societal and religious affinities with another country, their relations will significantly be influenced by these ties.

CHAPTER TWO

TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THREE LEVELS OF ANALYSIS

In this chapter, Turkish foreign policy will be examined through the lenses of three levels of analysis in the explanation of foreign policy of a country. It will be categorized into three parts and then put them within the context of the discussed levels of analysis, in chapter one. The first part will deal with individual level of analysis, under this as explained in the previous chapter, the main actor is individual foreign policy maker. For the purpose of this research and careful examination of Turkish foreign policy under the AKP government, Ahmet Davutoglu's vision, perception, ideas as well as his geopolitical imagination of Turkish foreign policy will be examined. The second part will deal with the state level of analysis, in which the domestic determinants of Turkish foreign policy will be examined. Concomitantly, those domestic determinants that contribute and influences Turkey's foreign policy makers' options will be discussed. These determinants consist of multiple actors and sub-actors that continue to shape the policy action of leaders in one policy or another. The third part will deal with the systemic level of analysis; under this international factors or determinants of Turkish foreign policy that often shapes foreign policy maker's decision will be examined. In this Turkish foreign policy will be critically examined within the context of the international environment and the factors that influences the actions of Turkey in the system.

2.1. Individual Level: Davutoglu's Vision

The core founders of the AKP comes from the political tradition that gives much emphasis and importance to the Ottoman past as well as the historical and cultural ties with the Arab world, such as President Abdullah Gul and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Ahmet

Davutoglu is not an exception. He was also a member of National View (Milli Gorus) background, which had contacts with the Islamic Movements of the Arab world (Altunisik and Martin, 2011:578). There is no surprise that he often perceived Turkey's foreign policy and politics at large from the Islamic perspective view, this is as a result of the orientation he received as a member of National View. In addition, hailed from the Anatolian city of Konya where daily activities of life are based on Islamic teachings. Therefore, there may be no objection if I say his psychology is shaped by the societal factors such as cultures, values and how he was grew up from childhood. In general his background and the generation to which he belong often influence how he is viewing the world around him.

Under the AKP Ahmet Davutoglu started as a foreign policy advisor to the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, before he finally become the foreign minister in May 2009. He is considered as an intellectual 'Architecture' of the new Turkish foreign policy under the AKP. To many his perceptions, world views, personal beliefs and understanding of the current international environment are what are shaping AKP's foreign policy. According to Aras (2009:129) it was Davutoglu who changed the rhetoric and practice of Turkish foreign policy, bringing to it a dynamic and multidimensional orientation. To him, he set the vision and style of the new foreign policy line and provided a framework for pursuing it.

It is undeniably true to discuss Turkish foreign policy under the AKP one should not ignore to give reference to Ahmet Davutoglu. This means that the Turkish foreign policy under the AKP is associated with his name (Grigoriadis, 2010:04). This is because, Davutoglu as an academician before, he is lucky to be given the opportunity to put into practice his famous theoretical work in the form of book named ''Strategic Depth '' which have been integrated into Turkish foreign policy as theoretical tool and strategy, along with his six new

fundamental foreign policy principles. All these have been influential and remain the guiding tools in are number of major foreign policy developments of AKP government.

Therefore, this is why it is chosen to examine in the individual level, the foreign policy vision, ideas, views, personal perceptions and beliefs of Ahmet Davutoglu by critically examine his two major works when explaining the AKP's foreign policy. This is because, as I will explore in the course of this research, all most all the strategies, the dimensions and focuses of AKP's new foreign policy are within the ''Strategic Depth Doctrine'' and the new fundamental foreign policy principles.

2.1.1. The "Strategic Depth" Doctrine

The doctrine is based on Davutoglu's ''Strategic Depth'' book published in 2001. The doctrine emphasized the uniqueness and importance of geopolitical position of Turkey and its historical and geographical depths. The concept of strategic depth is composed of four broad denominators; geographical depth, geo-cultural influence, historical depth and geo-economic importance (Murinson, 2012:06). According to Davutoglu Turkey will not be associated to a particular region; he perceived Turkey as a country that cannot be explained as geographically or culturally belonging to a specific region surrounding it. But, Turkey is Middle Eastern, Balkan, Caucasian and Mediterranean country; As Davutoglu argues:

"In terms of geography, Turkey occupies a unique space. As a large country in the midst of Afro-Eurasia's vast landmass, it may be defined as a central with multiple regional identities that cannot be reduced to one unified character. Like Russia, Germany, Iran and Egypt, Turkey cannot be explained geographically by associating it with one single region. Turkey's diverse regional composition lends it the capability of maneuvering in several in several regions simultaneously, in this sense, it controls an area of influence in its immediate environs" (Aras, 2009:130).

Accordingly, Davutoglu rejects the idea or popular saying that Turkey is a ''bridge country'' between regions, specifically between Islamic countries and the Christian West. Therefore, Turkey should not be presenting itself as such, nor should Turkey should perceive itself as regional power. Rather, due to its rich history, size, geographical location, Turkey should act as a ''central country'' a country with interests and influence in multiple regions (the Balkan, the Middle East, the Caucasus, the Black sea) (Ilecha, 2011:02). Davutoglu personally belief that labelling Turkey as bridge between Islam and the West, would downgrade Turkey to an instrument for the promotion of the strategic interest of other countries, Instead, Turkey should effectively utilize from its Ottoman legacy of historical and geographical depths.

In Davutoglu's view Turkey due to its history and geography is among the list of small number countries which he calls ''central power''. He called on Turkey not be contented with the regional role in Balkan, Caucasus, or Middle East, but it should seek to play a role as a central power country, because it is not a regional but global power. This could ultimately award it with global strategic significance. In this theory Davutoglu places Turkey, as a strong state, within a changing international environment. Ideationally, Davutoglu doctrine is based on self confidence, good neighbourliness and stability at home. Methodologically, the doctrine is novel and visionary as well as integrated and inclusive (Kadioglu, 2010). By integrated and inclusive means that whenever conflict arise, Turkey should not relate itself with a particular of alliance but should work with all parties to broker a solution.

Therefore, in 'strategic depth' the notion of Davutoglu's security discourses rest on the effective regional cooperation and creation of a sense of collective regional security for the protection of all based on shared interests, common objective which will be achievable through active engagement from all the Turkey's regional neighbours (Guney and Mandaci, 2013). When Turkey succeeded in the cooperation of its neighbours towards solving common

security threat, this will give it an opportunity to strategically utilize its historical and geographical depth, this will pave way for its global strategic ambitions.

Davutoglu identifies two conditions for Turkey to succeed in its global strategic ambitions. The first domestic politics; in which Turkey need to solve its own Kurdish problem and bridge the growing rift between secularist and Islamist elements in Turkish society. Secondly, as for the relations with neighbours; this means that Turkey needs to end its paranoid perspective and move towards resolving all its bilateral disputes which hampered relations with its neighbours. Hence, the ''zero problems with neighbours'' is targeted towards ending that phobic syndrome by establishing cordial relations with all its neighbours (Grigoriadis, 2010:05; Sozen, 2010:08).

Thus, the AKP government ambition is that in the near future Turkey's role will no longer be a bridge between Islamic East and Christian West. Instead, it will be a global player through its historical and geographical depth. The new foreign policy principles of AKP government are also compliment of the strategic depth doctrine.

2.1.2. New Fundamental Foreign Policy Principles

Davutoglu as the intellectual architect of the AKP foreign policy came up with three methodological principles as the background of six new operative principles of Turkish foreign policy. Firstly, he advocated visionary approach instead of crisis oriented one. During the Cold War because of its characteristics, Turkey was in crisis with Soviet Union, so the issue was managing the crisis. Now Turkey has a visionary foreign policy. Secondly, consistent and systematic frameworks, Turkish vision for the Middle East should not contrast to the approach in Central Asia or Balkan. The approach in Africa should not be different than the approach in Asia, nor should the approval in economic relations differ, i.e. in the G-20, with this understanding. Thirdly, soft power; this is a new style in the sense of political

rhetoric and tools, an instrument. This is arising from Turkey's culture, political ideas and policies. Today Turkey is using more soft power than hard power.

2.1.3. Balance between Security and Freedom

This principle is one of the important principles developed by Davutoglu to AKP government. According to him Turkey has successfully balance between providing security to its citizens without undermining their freedom, despite the perception of many after the 9/11 terrorist attack that a state cannot provide the two concurrently. He emphasized that, until recently in the Turkish psyche, there was a perception that to have a secure and safe country there need to be some limitation on freedom to in turn have security in Turkey. Instead, Davutoglu insist that under the AKP government they do not see these two concepts as contradictory to each other. Since the legitimacy of a given government depends on its ability to provide security for its citizens not at the expense of freedom and their fundamental human rights (Yilmaz, 2009:06).

Davutoglu, also have beliefs that these two concept are complimenting each other, because if you have ignore security for freedom you will have anger and chaos. Which means this will engulf the country into crisis. Also, if you ignore freedom for security, you will have an authoritarian, autocratic society. Under which there will be no exercising of fundamental human rights. He emphasized that Turkey does not ignore either of the two.

2.1.4. Zero Problems with Neighbours

A critical point here is the rapid abolishment of the once prevailing psychology that Turkey is a nation ''surrounded by sea on sides, but by enemies on four sides'' (Tekelioglu, 2007). Under the AKP Turkey wanted to improve its relations with all her neighbours because it aims to develop and restore cordial relations for the general benefit of all. This principle is

associated to so many criticisms, and Davutoglu was accused of being utopian. But was quick to backed his idea base on the example of a saying by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, ''peace at home, and peace abroad''.

No doubt that Turkey under the AKP governments has successfully achieved a peaceful relation with its neighbours, against the previous sour relations they went through. This can be noticed as in the case Syria, Iran, Armenia, and Iraq. The main Turkey's goal is to build strong economic, political and social ties with its neighbours while decreasing its dependency on the United States seemed to be within sight, as Barond (2012) stressed. However, this principle of zero problems with neighbours put into question when the Arab spring erupted in Syria. To the critics this shows the unrealistic nature of the principle.

Despite this, Davutoglu maintained that Turkey's relations with its neighbours now follows the right track in comparison to previous years (Davutoglu, 2008:05). He further emphasized that there is no contradiction with Turkey's emphasis on democratic demands, which in some cases requires it to confront repressive regimes, and the foreign policy principle of zero problems with neighbours. Even before the Arab spring Turkey achieved a good relation with the regimes, because at the time they were not at the war with their own people. But when they turn to suppress the demands and freedom of their citizens, Turkey sided with the people and Turkey still remain committed to the democratic vision for the region (Kardas, 2012:05).

2.1.5. Multidimensional Foreign Policy

As a rational foreign policy maker, Davutoglu faulted Kemalist ideology for not been multidimensional, pointing to the opportunities that Turkey missed because of its one dimensional foreign policy. To Davutoglu, multidimensional paradigm refers to having simultaneous and harmonious relationship with different international actors as well as approaching different issues by following the same multidimensional principle (Yasiltas and

Balci, 2013:12). Being a central power country and because of the global strategic ambition of Turkey does not to be engaging one dimensional foreign policy by reaching out to other global actors and regions. This does not mean that Turkey view these new regions and actors as an alternative engagement but rather, as a strategy in which each complementing the other, not in competition. One can notably understand since AKP came into power it expands its relations to some neglected regions (Central Asia, Africa and Middle East), it has no longer restricted its relations to the West.

Under the steering role of Davutoglu Turkey's top priorities, including the EU accession process or Turkey's Western alignment, are by nature none of them is more important than the rest. According to Davutoglu the world is not a bipolar world anymore. It means Turkey's good relations with Russia are not an alternative to the EU or United States, same applied to remaining regions (Yilmaz, 2009 and Ilecha, 2011:04). In his view the foreign policy is no longer perceived as a series of bilateral relations or foreign policy moves but as series of mutually reinforcing and interlocking process. Therefore, Ankara acquires the capability and responsibility to pursue an integrated and multidimensional foreign policy given it has multi regional identities.

2.1.6. "Rhythmic Diplomacy"

This new foreign policy principle is also known as ''active involvement in all global and international organization issues''. By this rhythmic diplomacy, Turkey sees itself as a global actor in all global issues and international governmental organizations. This will change its static diplomatic understanding to dynamic condition for mutual interdependency. The basic assumption is that Turkey should not only have the means but also the mentality to adopt to a rapidly changing international agenda, to be present where critical decisions are being taken

and to be proactive rather than reactive when problems arises (Ilecha, 2011:05, Yasiltas and Balci, 2013:11).

The fruitful outcome of this principle can be seen, when Turkey secured a non-permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council 2009-2010, its membership in G-20, its observer status in the African Union and the Arab League as well as its membership in the Organization of Islamic Conference; all demonstrated the realization of this particular principle (Davutoglu, 2008:15 and 2012). Additionally, since the AKP came to power Turkey has increased its number of diplomatic embassies; this is more visible in Sub-Saharan Africa. Turkey under AKP gained so much influence in different international and regional organizations. To Davutoglu, this is part of the transformation of Turkey from the merely regional power to central power country with global power influence.

2.1.7. Proactive Foreign Policy

Active rather than reactive foreign policy is another name of this foreign policy principle. According to Davutoglu, it is aims at preventing and managing crisis and conflict in the close neighbourhood for Turkey, like the Balkan, Middle East, and Caucasus. To him, proactive means proactive means preventative at the same time. If there are crises in the regions, Turkey should not wait until the tensions escalate to higher level and even to war. The principle also emphasized that the Turkey's foreign policy can be achieved not only among nations but also among the actors and groups within the state with regards to preventing the looming conflicts or resolving the current ones (Yilmaz, 2009:07).

The most practical result could be seen in Turkey's effort to mediate the conflicts of Syria-Israel, Bosnia-Serbia, Israel-Palestine and Iran-the West on Iran nuclear programme (Yasiltas and Balci, 2013:13). This is not restricted to only close geographical regions of Turkey. Turkey also brokered a deal when there was a political conflict in the interim government of

Somalia between the former Prime Minister and the President. According to Davutoglu Turkey forms a traditional imagination in minds of the people of its neighbourhood. And Turkey's neighbours expect it to do something in order to manage international conflict in times of crises. Davutoglu is an influential actor, trusted mediator and as a result former France President recognised his effort in the Middle East peace process, in a conference Mark Parris of Brookings Institution described him as the '' Henry Kissinger of Turkey'' (Kanat, 2010:218).

2.1.8. Developing Relations with Neighbouring Regions And Beyond

This principle offers a global perspective of AKP foreign policy making. It suggests that no geographical regions would be considered as far away regions beyond foreign policy activism of Turkey. Therefore, Davutoglu aims at developing intensive foreign relations beyond Turkey's neighbouring countries. This principle could be considered as the summary of a globally sealed 'Zero Problems' principle because, Turkey developed relations not only with Syria, Iran, Iraq and Armenia but also with Russia and Sub-Saharan African countries. According to this premise, these relations are to be based upon rational calculations, not on ideological accounts (Davutoglu, 2008:10 and Aktas, 2010:79).

Davutoglu claims this premise conceives foreign policy relations more than security based border issues. It invokes Turkey's strength and capability to establish and improve relations at a global level as a result of its active contacts beyond its close geographical borders. The alliance of civilization has been considered as an example of in this context. In conclusion, when one takes a look on the two major works of Davutoglu, the strategic depth doctrine and new fundamental foreign policy principles, it can be understood that they are like bricks use for building Turkish foreign policy under the AKP and one can understand also that AKP leadership gave Davutoglu the steering wheel to handle Turkish foreign policy.

2.2. State Level: Domestic Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy

For the purpose of clear understanding of state level of analysis, it is important to analyse the basic determinants of Turkish foreign policy which includes, governmental (e.g. *TIKA*) and non-governmental organizations (e.g. *Hizmet* and *TUSKON*), political forces and sub national actors within Turkish society, that are often influences and set parameters or shape the actions of foreign policy makers.

2.2.1. The Foreign Policy of the AKP Government

AKP came to power in November, 2002 general election and succeeded in winning the next two general elections of 2007 and 2011 respectively. The prominent members of the party are conservative Muslim democrats. Since the party took the mantle of leadership in Turkey there has been a fundamental shift in the way Turkey's political elites shape country's foreign policy. Ankara has become more proactive, assertive and independent, less focused on traditional hard power and more on a "diplomacy first" approach. AKP also build a broader conservative coalition with support from liberals which emphasized a market economy and fighting injustice, corruption and inequality (Akcakoca, 2009:01, Dalay and Friedman, 2013).

The AKP has made important transformation on Turkish foreign policy. The democratization of foreign policy emerges as a key element of the AKP government. Foreign policy has been opened to public debate, previously fixed positions on a number of key issues has become the focal point of public debate such as Cyprus question, relation with Armenia, and with Kurds in Northern Iraq (Onis and Yilmaz, 2009:24). Despite the sensitiveness of these issues as far as foreign policy issue is in Turkey, AKP succeeded in bringing them out for public debate. Because of its desire to achieve it's well known zero problems with neighbours' policy, not because they are no longer sensitive issues but this will make Turkish citizens to feel that,

AKP government has come with new brand of foreign policy which is ready to accommodate public opinion.

In the same development, the media and the public opposition contributed and became an important variable in the calculation of Turkey's foreign policy options over the war on Iraq in 2003, when the Turkish Grand National Assembly voted against the deployment of United States military personnel on Turkish soil. Furthermore, public opinion also has significantly played a role in Turkish policy towards EU accession. When AKP came to power it made so many reforms, when the public support for EU membership was at peak of 74% in 2002, but after 2005 there was a striking drop to 50% and this discourages government efforts (Onis and Yilmaz, 2009:132).

The AKP also succeeded in eliminating military's decisive position in Turkish foreign policy making. With its majority seat in parliament consolidated its position and succeeded in exercising full authority over the decision making on foreign and security policy issues. In 2004 the AKP succeeded in removing the obstacle that prevented the appointment of civilian as Secretary General of National Security Council (NSC), since it was the most decisive political institution in Turkish politics. AKP uses constitutional and legal amendment under the EU influence to reduce the number of the military in the Council by increasing the number of the civilian, thus reducing the military's influence has facilitated both a broadening and a softening of Turkish foreign policy under AKP (Larabee, 2010:161;Ozlan, 2010:129).

When possible the AKP government tried to make greater use of soft power; economic, political and cultural in place of the alternative heavily securitized approaches, especially in relations with its Middle Eastern neighbours. Davutoglu gave further clues to his thinking by suggesting that rather than acting as a mere bridge between the West and the Muslim World,

a previously repeated mantra of Turkish foreign policy spokesmen. Turkey should act as a 'central country' breaking away from a static and 'single-parameter policy', and becoming a 'problem solver' contributing to global and regional peace (Hale and Ozbudun, 2010:120).

Since AKP came to power Turkey not only developed political, economic and strategic ties with neighbouring countries in the Balkan, Caucasia and the Middle East. It also further extended its interest to long neglected regions in its foreign policy such as Africa and Central Asia. This is partly due to the full implementation of Davutoglu's new fundamental principles, domestic developments as well as some international factors that played key roles in developing Turkey-Africa relations. In 2005 Turkey declared the year as year of Africa, in the same year Turkey gained observer status in the African Union. The new Turkish foreign policy has a new mission of improving relations at global and regional levels and laying favourable foundation for mutually institutional, political, economic and societal engagements with countries in a wider geographical area (Kalaycioglu, 2011:1209).

2.2.2. Turkey's Axis Shift

When the AKP came to power there is a major significant and visible change in Turkish foreign policy. This brought about the debate of ''axis shift'' in AKP foreign policy. Dedeoglu (2010) argues that the terms axis shift is used for countries that are supposedly changing their overall political positions, meaning that they abandon their current system of security and values to replace them with a new system. If in the case of Turkey, there is complete departure from the tradition position to completely new system it can be said that there is an axis shift.

Adam (2013:140) viewed Turkey's shift from the angle of its EU accession negotiations. He argues that, the lack of Turkey's progress in accession negotiations with the EU is one of the reasons why Ankara started to look for new ways to increase its influence in the international

arena. Following the December 2006 summit decisions, the European Council decided to block eight chapters out of 13 that are opened and sparked the on-going debate in Europe on the European identity of Turkey, all these led to the rethinking of Turkish foreign policy priorities.

However, Cornell (2012:15), Dickenson and Kennedy (2011:152) and Altunisik (2012) emphasized that the main reason for this debate is AKP rapprochement with Islamist regimes in the Middle East and also other remarkable change of Turkish foreign policy towards the region. Ankara policy engagements with Tehran and the total rejection of further economic sanction on Iran at the United Nations Security Council, the breakdown of Turkey's alliance with Israel; when Erdogan openly criticized Israel at the Davos world Economic Summit and the tragic event of ''Mavi Marmara'' crisis in 2010, in which nine Turkish citizen activist were killed by Israel soldiers. After the incidence Turkey condemned Israel for ''state terrorism''. Again Ankara also broke the Western boycott by inviting Hamas leader Khaled Meshal to Ankara. All these clearly indicated how Ankara pursued an independent foreign policy even if it is against the Western interest. These contributed to the growing perception, that Turkey under AKP is moving towards different direction.

On the other hand, AKP officials like Davutoglu refutes the claim of axis shift, but rather they associated this changes as a result of active, proactive as well as the multidimensional foreign policy of AKP and also the influence of other factors like the economic crisis of 2008, Turkish economic growth and the influence of Davutoglu's doctrine. All these put together made Turkey to develop an independent, pragmatic foreign policy with positive engagement towards the Middle East (Criss, 2010:14).

Davutoglu contributed to the axis shift debate in which he questioned the axis in Turkish foreign policy by explaining Turkey's strategic and historical position. He explained that

Turkey cannot change its history and geography and other developments are variables. He believed that Turkish foreign policy is based on the changes in the international system and axis shift perception is not in the agenda of Turkish foreign policy (Kara: 2011:42). In October 2009, the Prime Minister Erdogan delivered a key note address at the Istanbul Forum; ''there is no axis shift of Turkey. We are standing where we have been standing at the beginning of our political power.'' He added that the growing influence of Turkey in its South and East, in its near abroad, is actually ''taking the burden off the shoulders of the EU.'' In November of the same year, the President Abdullah Gul also refuted these perceptions; he said '' what Turkey is doing is clear. Turkey, surely, is moving simultaneously in every direction towards East and West, North and South (Candar, 2009).

In addition, according to Ari and Pirinci (2010:08) and Candar (2009) claims that the leitmotive of Turkey's opening to the East is also economic. The Turkish economy is growing at a faster rate; it has an urgent need of markets for its growing economy and also need energy to fuel its growth. So this brought the new investments in the Middle East and the trade volume with the region increased that never can be compared with the past. In fact, the primary achievement of AKP foreign policy has been its record-breaking increase of trade volume with the Middle East and Russia.

Altunisik and Martin (2011:565) argues that the security challenges facing Turkey from some of the PKK supporters motivated Turkey to develop relations with those countries in the region, in order to contain and eliminate the security threat posed by PKK, like its relation with Syria and Northern Iraq. Another reason is achieving recognition as a global player, is based in the great past on Turkey's growing influence in the complex and vital Middle East. This is part of ambitious doctrine of Davutoglu which sees Turkey as central power country, seeking global strategic importance.

2.2.3. The Concept of Neo-Ottomanism

Just like ''axis shift'' debate, the concept of neo-Ottomanism is also surrounded by many different views. The concept is considered to be a criticism to the ''strategic depth doctrine'' of Ahmet Davutoglu. The neo-Ottomanism was introduced by a leading Turkish columnist Cengiz Candar (Murinson, 2006). This is an intellectual movement that advocated Turkish pursuit of active and diversified foreign policy in the region based on the Ottoman historical heritage. This is in line with the AKP leadership ambition and zeal to actively involve and participate in the affairs of the Middle East, Balkan, Caucasus and Central Asia. With the perception that Turkey is the leader of Muslim- Turkic world and central power in Eurasia, as Davutoglu categorically stated in his book.

Colak (2006:588) describes neo-Ottomanism as act of constructing new image and presence in the former Ottoman territories of Balkan, Caucasus, Middle East and Central Asia. He notes two main characteristics; first, the articulation of Turkish nationalism and increased political and cultural tolerance for diversity as in the Ottoman past. Second the elimination of economic border among the Balkan, Caucasian and Middle Eastern countries with respecting the political boundaries of the countries in the ex-Ottoman space.

The critics of this concept defined it as the return to a notion of a Turkey exerting power and the continuation of imperial aims over its traditional Ottoman sphere of influence (Baykal: 2010:12). In this regard what Davutoglu has advocated is relates with diversifying Turkey's geopolitical options by creating Turkish zones of influence in the Balkan, the Caucasus, and the Middle East as well as the order instituting role are imperialistic ambitions of new Turkish foreign policy. Davutoglu has rejected this and pointed out that Turkey's engagement to its neighbours does not mean imperial aims and further argued that is impossible to change

Turkey's geography and historical past. Therefore, he totally rejected the concept of neo-Ottomanism because of its imperial impression.

Sozen (2010:6-7) points out that, before the coming of AKP government, the republican government that next after Ottoman empire wanted to be European and turned away from the former Ottoman territories, because of the believe that , they were traditional and prone to conflict. But, with the coming of AKP it wanted to restore the previous relations and realized the potential of those regions. Therefore, neo-Ottomanism does not mean resurrection of the empire nor an imperialist project, instead, Turkey wanted to reconcile with history and cannot turn its back to its history and geography.

Following the end of Cold War there was emergence of newly independent states in the Balkans, the Caucasus and Central Asia, this increase the sense of Turkic identity which offered Turkey ability to develop closer interactions with those new republics. It is also aimed at correcting the abnormalities of the Cold War years, by deepening political dialogue, economic integration, increasing trade, cultural and educational activities and restoring functional diplomatic ties. Ankara therefore, exert more soft power of political, economic, diplomatic and cultural influence than hard power in formally Ottoman territories as well as other regions where Turkey has strategic and national interest (Taspinar:2008, Wigen:2008 and Dinc, 2011:06).

Finally, it has become clear to us that the concept of neo-Ottomanism is not an imperialist agenda and vision of Turkish foreign policy as some critics of Davutoglu's doctrine argued. Rather is strategic policy of rediscovering the former Ottoman territories after the end of the Cold War complimented by AKP new foreign policy principles especially its zero problems with neighbour and multidimensional foreign policy principles. According to him, Turkey's

new neighbourhood policy is not based on the Ottoman legacy but a foreign policy built on the principle of "zero problems."

2.2.4. Economic Development of Turkey

The recorded success in the reformation of Turkish economy considered to be primary reason for two consecutive general elections victories of AKP in 2007 and 2011 respectively. Before the coming of the party to the power, the economy was in crisis, associated triple digit inflation, the Lira losing 24% of its value, and it interest rate rise above 100%. The economic crisis under the coalition government of Democratic Left (DSP), Motherland (ANAP) and Nationalist Movement (MHP) parties played into the hand of AKP which announced it parted its way with the Islamist National View (Milli Görüs) movement. Indeed, by approving one of the harshest austerity package programs of the IMF and decisively regulating financial sector, that had delibilitative results for smaller companies and poor segments of the Turkish society, the coalition government well committed a political suicide by opening way to AKP government. AKP continued to reform program and privatization as envisaged in the IMF program very firmly. It is generally accepted that restructuring or transforming the economic system also can be a source of foreign policy change (Altunisik and Martin, 2011:578). The new industrial estates started to emerge, especially in Anatolia, seeking for new markets less accessed by industrialist countries. As a result of the emergence of the ''Anatolian Tigers,'' the government pursuing an export-led growth strategy aimed at increasing the volume of trade with the nearby markets particularly in the South and synchronized its foreign policy by and large with those goals.

According to Dinc (2011:63) and Kutlay (2011) the rising of ambitious conservative business circles considered Turkey's economic system as closed economy, they wants to deepen Turkey's integration into global economy. These economic actors that were excluded before

naturally encouraged the AKP to pursue a pragmatic, economic-base multidimensional foreign policy and also pushed policy makers to reformulate policies on close geographical neighbours and increase economic ties with different regions of the world. Turkey mainly relies on trade and investment as its economic instruments in developing relations with its neighbours and they also serve as facilitators and strategic policies in its foreign policy.

Kirisci and Kaptanoglu (2011:705-715) perceived Turkish foreign policy under the AKP as increasingly becoming the foreign policy of a trading state, seeking markets and economic benefits rather than ideology driven state seeking fundamental reorientation. Although they noted the success recorded whereby Turkey become a member in G-20 which put it sixteen largest economies in the world and Sixth in Europe. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) noted that if current economic growth rate of Turkey keep growing at the same rate, and supported by financial stability, international investor confidence and a dynamic business sector, Turkish economy will become among the strongest of OECD countries.

They further noted that economic and trade issues had for some time increasingly been entering and influencing the agenda of Turkish foreign policy. The Turkish mediation effort in its neighbourhood also need to be look from the perspective of its rising needs for markets and trade interest. Because without greater stability and security in it surrounding, this will jeopardize investor's confidence and will affect Turkey's business and trade interest if its neighbourhood struck in conflict and instability. Therefore, the zero problems policy put in place significantly increase Turkey's exports and business involvement abroad. This new foreign policy principle facilitated the expansion of trade and business relations.

2.2.5. Civil Society Organizations and Turkish Foreign Policy

After AKP's coming to power there has been an increase in the volume of civil societies and social movement influence on Turkish foreign policy making. Government for the first time utilized and took advantage of discourses created by Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) (e.g. *TUSKON* and *Hizmet*) especially on Africa. The policy influence is based on the specific activities undertaken by them (Ozkan and Akgun, 2010:529). This means that, if their activities are in line with government foreign policy activism they can influence government decisions.

In terms of the growing influence of non-governmental organization on Turkish foreign policy, the Gulen Movement which is faith-based networks, popularly known in Turkey as *Cemaat* or *Hizmet* (Service) is the most significant of all the civil societies in Turkey. This movement represent a growing sector of Turkish society. It is difficult not realize the domestic and global impact of this loose network of volunteers and civil society organization who promote educational activities along with dialogue among those of different faiths (Akarcesme, 2013 and Alpay, 2010). Therefore, this contributed a lot in terms of the promotion and developing Turkish soft power abroad. Its educational activities in forms of giving out scholarships, building schools represent the best Turkish foreign policy in those places.

The AKP and Gulen movement exchanges support to each other, the AKP publicly support his educational initiatives in Turkey and abroad, while AKP received support of the media outlet with which the movement enjoys a close relationship. Most important the movement led by Fethullah Gulen has appreciable influence in economic, political and cultural spheres and considered the third power in Turkish politics after AKP and military, since its members infiltrated state institutions, including the police force, judiciary and gendarmerie. More

importantly, many of the *Hizmet* members are prominent in Turkey's foreign affairs sector (Balici, 2013).When we look into the functions of bureaucracy, we can easily agree that the Gulen members can influence foreign policy decision since they are charged with gathering information, implementing policies and at times making foreign policy decision. Bureaucratically, this can makes it easier for them to play a role in foreign policy making, at least by influencing decisions.

From the point of Turkey-Africa relations, the civil society organization that has contributed in developing trade and investment relations with Turkey and Africa is Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists of Turkey (Türk İşadamları ve Sanayicileri Konfederasyonu - TUSKON). Is a conservative business association which is ideologically and politically close to the ruling AKP. TUSKON has been very active in developing Turkey's ties with the world in the economic field since its inception. Luckily, the organization was founded in 2005 when the Turkish economy was steadily growing. It's contributed in acceleration and boosting trade relations with African countries, exemplifying the converging interest between state and civil society (Ozkan and Akgun, 2010:540).

TUSKON acquired its influence by organizing and inviting many investors and diplomats to Turkey for its business summits in Istanbul. The first meeting was organized in May 2006 in Istanbul with the participation of 500 businessmen and 20 ministers from 31 African countries and 1,500 businessmen from Turkish side and some that followed in 2007 and 2008, all the meeting were opened by the State Minister for Foreign Trade. Therefore, TUSKON's pioneering role as an association in developing Turkey-Africa relations is very significant (Ozkan and Akgun, 2010:541).

2.3. Systemic Level: International Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy

In the systemic level, it is to be examined some of the major developments and factors that shaped and still shaping Turkish foreign policy making. Since the system is very complex, unpredictable and ever changing, Turkey has to adopt this dynamic nature of the system by considering it foreign policy options.

2.3.1. Turkish Foreign Policy in the Cold War Era

After the end of Second World War, the international system experienced a very dramatic and significant change, with the rising of two dominant and ideologically different power blocs; United States and Soviet Union. Their emergence changed the character and structure of the system from balance of power structure to a bipolar structure. This significantly influenced relations between the other states in the system and Turkey was not excluded.

According to Aydin (2006:10) two major developments necessitated Turkey's decision to establish closer ties with the Western countries during the Cold War. First, there was a change in the nature of the international system which rapidly evolved from a 'balance of power' structure to a 'bipolar' structure. Therefore, policy neutrality was not possible at all given the importance geographical location of a country like Turkey. Second, the emergence of Soviet Union and its continued threat to Turkey, and subsequent demand upon Turkey. Turkish policy makers believed that with pressure and military threat from Soviet Union on Turkey's territorial integrity the best option was to join Western alliance.

The Cold War dictated Turkey's strategic dependence on the United States, which acted as a global security provider. With it eastern frontier bordering the Soviet Union, Turkey became a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member in 1952. This membership in the military alliance organization affected Turkey's foreign policy and limited its foreign policy

space. Because, Turkey was unable to diversify its relation with neighbours due to the fact that, they were either members of Warsaw Pact led by Soviet Union or members of Non-Aligned Movement (Ulgen, 2012:42). After becoming a member Ankara started to follow one dimensional foreign policy evaluating all international events through the lenses of Washington in order to secure its place within the Western bloc.

The period of 1950s was a golden age in Turkey's relations with the West. As a result of its committed, demonstrable allegiance to Western alliance provided Turkey with security, significant military assistance, foreign support and economic aid, in what was known as 'Truman Doctrine;' the doctrine was set forth by United States president Harry Truman and the 'containment' policy was introduced as part of the doctrine. The containment was a strategic policy against the Soviet Union land offensive in the Middle East should war occurs. Turkey became one of the corner stone of the containment strategy due to its geostrategic position (Leffler, 1985:818 and Mayall, 1997:45).

The events of 1970s, most important the Cyprus crisis of 1974 showed Turkey the cumulative result of the foreign policy it had been following since the end of the Second War; loneliness in the international arena, alienation from the West. Hence Turkey made a concerted effort to come back to the international arena as a reliable friendly nation. In the 1980s as result of external criticism and hostile European environment forced Turkish foreign decision makers to look for alternative connections which led to Turkey's opening towards the Middle East, rapprochement efforts with the third world countries and former eastern bloc ones. (Aydin, 2005:14 and Aydin, 2006:98).

2.3.2. Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era

The disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 after the end of Cold War in 1989 brought about fundamental changes in the international environment. The end of the war resulted to

the unipolar power structure with United States the only super power throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. Despite the end of the Cold War Ankara rapport with the West continued. But the changes, particularly the end of the Soviet menace provided Turkey with the new foreign policy opportunities.

After the war Turkey sought to develop and improve its relations with its alienated neighbours and set out to become the leader of the new Turkic states in the Caucasus and Central Asia (Sozen, 2010:02). The Turkey's regional influence and importance also gained momentum as a result of changes in regional and global politics. Thus the end of the Cold War and the transformation of the international system enabled Turkey to play new and more independent role in its region. For instance, Iraq invasion of Kuwait offered that opportunity and demonstrated Turkey's strategic importance during the 1990-1991 Gulf War, where Turkey managed to be a central player in the Allied Powers (Altunisik and Martin, 2011:575 and Sayari, 2000:171).

Furthermore, the end of the Cold War altered Turkish foreign policy with its neighbours it became more active in Balkan, Middle East, Caucasus and Central Asia. Actually new developments in the Balkan, Eurasia and the Middle East presented Turkey with new risks, insecurities and challenges. However the changes also allowed shift in Turkish foreign policy in the involved regions from reactive to proactive during the AKP government (Sayari, 2000:165). Karan (2011:24) notes that when the Cold War was over Turkey and Israel relationship became closer and both states strengthened their relations diplomatically and militarily through high level visits and bilateral agreements. He emphasized, the strategic partnership was mainly based on common interest and some concern of threat from neighbouring states such as Syria and Iran.

2.3.3. Geopolitical Location of Turkey

Turkey possessed unique geopolitical location the basic element that Turkish foreign policy makers are taking into consideration in the foreign policy decision making process. The Turkish border has become a source of strength and weakness. This is due to the number of neighbours and their relative intensions. Turkey's neighbours have characteristics that lead to the strengthening of relations while some leads to feeling of insecurity.

Since the coming of AKP to power, it is virtually impossible to discuss the geopolitical importance in Turkish foreign policy without reference to Ahmet Davutoglu. He perceived and explained Turkish foreign policy and Turkey's rile in the international system with reference to such geopolitical concepts as ''central power'', ''order'', ''civilizational geography'', and ''strategic depth''. A central metaphor is used to express the potential of Turkey, to have more central power place in world politics as Davutoglu emphasized. This metaphor was inspired from Mackinder's theory (Yasiltas, 2013:672 and Bagci, 2009:15). The works of Mackinder attached importance to the region neighbouring Turkey this contributed to the significance importance of geopolitical position of Turkey in world politics.

Its peculiar geographical position makes Turkey a Balkan, Mediterranean, Black Sea, Caucasian and Middle Eastern country all at the same time. These multiple geographical identity may be regarded as the major motive behind the major effort of Turkish foreign policy makers to portray Turkey as ''bridge'' between Asia and Europe. As Ersen (2012:29) argues the bridge metaphor was not only aimed at introducing Turkey as a link between two continents, but also something which clearly added a substantial value to Turkey's ''exceptional geopolitical importance''. This exceptional geography of Turkey motivates her

to pursue active rather than reactive foreign policy and multidimensional one, during the AKP government.

Furthermore the new geographical discourse in the AKP period has been formulated through the analysis of Turkey's international position in the international order, its position in terms of location, location in the midst of trouble spots of the Middle East, the Balkan and the Caspian regions. Also its position in terms of role, both positions explained how Turkey acts and where it belongs and all became significant factors in Turkish foreign policy (Altunisik and Tur, 2008:89).

2.3.4. Soft Power in Turkish Foreign Policy

The term soft power in Turkish foreign policy means Turkey should implement and take measures that are free of coercion when implementing its foreign policy. The desecuritization of Turkish foreign policy is associated with Davutoglu's principle of ''zero problems with neighbours'' the principle brought about change in the issues related to security discourses. Turkey get rid of the notion that, it is ''surrounded by enemies'' and now tries to address and resolve problems with its neighbours by adopting measures through the use of soft power (Kaplan, 2011). Turkey under AKP government is increasingly using dialogue, economic interdependence and diplomatic ties to build better relations with all its neighbouring countries.

The use of soft power to promote and achieve Turkey's foreign policy interest is a clear result of Turkey's democratization process, growing determination to look after diplomatic and political resolution of regional problems, the continuation of EU accession process and the recent rapid economic growth which has led to the substantial increase in trade and investment, which developed into signing a number of Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with its neighbouring countries in the MENA region (Adam, 2013:147 and Oguzlu 2011:15). This

development no doubt accelerated the level of Turkey's economic growth, by strengthening the rise of the level of imports and exports and expanding the volume of trade (Kenes, 2013).

According to Oguzlu (2007:90) the current globalization process contributes to Turkey's soft power. A militarized and securitized foreign policy by Turkey will contradicts the idea which globalization fosters that, we are all in the same boat. Since global issues are getting too close and complex political solutions will be more suitable. He further, notes as a result of EU's demand on limiting the military's influence on the formulation and implementation of foreign security policies also contributes to the Turkey's soft power policies.

The increase Turkey's diplomatic activities abroad attest to the growing salience of soft power of persuasion. For example, the humanitarian activities executed by the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (Türk Uluslararası İşbirliği ve Kalkınma Ajansı-TIKA), and the number of embassies across the globe have increased. Most notably, Turkey has opened new embassies in Africa sub-Saharan countries; erstwhile considered as far distance places (Altinay, 2008:56 and Kalin, 2011:9). TIKA for instance, is delivering development assistance through technical projects and humanitarian activities throughout Africa. It shows the depth of Turkish soft power.

2.3.5. Turkey in the United Nations

Although Turkey has been a member of United Nations several decades before the coming of AKP into power. But its principle of active involvement in all global and international organizations issues has changed its static diplomatic understanding to dynamic foreign policy activism. In the AKP era, Turkey succeeded in becoming a non permanent member in the United Nation Security Council (UNSC) for the period of 2009-2010.

Turkish President Abdullah Gul (2007: 14) gives out the reasons why Turkey wanted to become non permanent member in the UNSC. He described United Nations as theonly genuinely universal organization encompassing almost all state in the world and the Security Council is the primary organ for dealing with vital security and peace issues of the world. Turkey does not want to be left behind in addressing and resolving some of the critical security issues bedevilling the international community. He further noted that majority of the security problems that were on the stage of the UNSC were taking place in Turkey's close geographical neighbours from Balkan through Caucasus and the Middle East to Central Asia.

The need and desire to secure the seat in UNSC and its tireless effort to achieve this goal, made Turkey to open new Turkish diplomatic mission in Africa and elsewhere and acted in the resolution of some deep seated conflicts in its close neighbourhood as well as delivering economic assistance to many poor countries (Aras, 2009:152). The process increased Turkey's role in international politics and acquired prestige internationally, the multidimensional and proactive principles proved to be assertive.

Some of the notable resolutions passed during Turkey tenure were; the resolution on the intention of United Nations to deploy peacekeeping troops in Somalia and the resolution to extend the mandate of the UN mission in Sudan's Darfur as well as renewal of the UN mission in operation in Ivory Coast. As a country which takes important initiative in peace building Turkey adopted an integrated and determined stance towards peace, security and development (turkey4unsc.org and UN press release). Turkey also hosted and lunched so many programmes under the auspices of the UN such as Alliance of Civilization, Mediation for Peace, and the Fourth UN Conference on the Least Developed Countries.

Finally, Turkey has contributed immensely from its membership in the UNSC on various issues of different geography like the Africa, which appeared prominently on the council's

agenda and this gave Turkey a further opportunity to extend its diplomatic and humanitarian activities to far away geographies.

2.3.6. Turkey in the Current Era of Globalization

Since the end of Cold War there is increasing diminishing of political and military rivalries as dominant issues in the international relations. The national borders become porous to the flow of information and other information technology developments. These bring about profound positive and negative changes in states relations (economic, political and socially cultural). Therefore, decision making process has changed because through globalization security based foreign policy orientation was declined and economic and cultural values emerged. Turkey in particular the EU values and norms such as democracy, rule of law and respect to human rights, emergence of economic markets, increasing role of NGOs and media all gained importance in shaping Turkish foreign policy (Serbos, 2003:142).

In an era of globalization, Turkish state is becoming more liberalized and increasingly sensitive to market forces. The process also renders distance increasingly insignificant because it integrates the economic, social and cultural relations across borders. This makes Turkey to deepen its policies of reaching out to Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and Asia Pacific regions that is home to many rising and emerging economic powers. This clearly shows that globalization does not only develop and influence Turkish bilateral relation in its close geographical neighbourhood, but strengthen Turkey's need and desire to create positive foreign policy decisions around the globe notably by conducting active and multidimensional foreign policy (Nilufer, 2004:10).

The current globalization also breeds some new emerging regional powers economically, politically and militarily known as BRICS countries which consist of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. Given its economic, political and military strength, Turkey can be

considered as a regional power. Not only that the pivotal role of Turkey is becoming increasingly important in its region leading numerous high level diplomatic contacts to promote peace and mediate conflict, these enhance its status as regional power (Yilmaz and Onis, 2009:22).

Davutoglu stated Turkey's overriding objective for the future is to become an independent regional hegemony. He stated this in April 2012 when addressing Turkish parliament; thus:

'' A new Middle East is emerging. We will continue to be the master, the leader, and the servant of this new Middle East. In the new Middle East, the aspirations of the people and justice will rule; not tyranny, oppression and dictatorships. And we will be (a) strong, defender of this voice. And a new zone of peace, stability and prosperity will emerge around Turkey'' (Ulgen, 2012:43).

Davutoglu was giving reference to the profound changes and transformation that the region is undergoing as a result of the Arab Spring. He therefore, vested Turkey to have a strong voice in the region by influencing and guiding the developments taking place. He considered peace as the new foundation of this new Middle East and Ankara will be the pioneer and spokesman for this peace. Turkey's foreign policy makers understands that for Turkey to have global strategic influence, has to have regional power opportunities and play its regional role as order-settler and stabilizer for its region.

Conclusively, from the individual and state level to the systemic level of Turkish foreign policy analysis, the ideas, views and perceptions of Ahmet Davutoglu remain at the centre and pioneering factors of AKP foreign policy relations and engagements. But this does not mean that other levels are not relevant, rather on Turkey and Sub-Saharan Africa relations they complement each other.

CHAPTER THREE

TURKEY AND SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA RELATIONS FROM THE LENSES OF THREE LEVELS OF ANALYSIS UNDER THE AKP GOVERNMENT

In order to understanding of Turkey and Sub-Saharan Africa relations, it is important to analyze and examine from the method of three levels of analysis in accordance with previous chapters. The chapter therefore deals with the Turkey and Sub-Saharan Africa relations by explaining and examining how these relations evolved and the driving factors that reinforce and characterises it under the AKP government.

3.1. Historical Background

The historical background of Turkey and Sub-Saharan Africa relations can be divided into three periods for the sake of clarity. The first period covers Ottoman Empire's relations with Sub-Saharan Africa until the establishment of Turkish republic in 1923. The second period is from 1923 to 2002. The third period is during the AKP government once following the party's coming to power, Turkey's attention to the African politics has undergone a drastic shift.

3.1.1. The Ottoman Empire and Sub-Saharan Africa

The relations between Turkey and Sub-Saharan Africa are older than the establishment of the Turkish Republic and it can be traced back to the times of the Ottomans. When the Ottoman Empire settled in the North Africa, they became close to Sub-Saharan Africa as well. Historically, some part of the Sub-Saharan Africa became partially under the control of the Ottoman Empire. In the sixteenth century the Ottoman naval campaign to the East Africa to stop the Portuguese colonial expansion gave the partial control of the territories where currently Eretria, Djibouti, Somalia and Ethiopia situate the Ottomans (Ipek, 2010). At the

same time the Ottoman Empire tried to block the Spanish expansion in the Mediterranean with the assistance of Algeria, Tunisia and Libya.

In the Western Sub-Saharan Africa then Mayor of Trablus Turgut Ali Pasa formed a friendship and alliance with the Kanem Borno Empire which prevailed in today's Northern Nigeria, Niger and Cameroon. In 1575 Kanem Borno Empire sent a delegation to Istanbul during the time of Sultan Murad III under the leadership of Alhaji Yusuf. Subsequently, in the same year the Ottoman Empire and Kanem Borno Empire signed a defence pact in 1575. Under the pact the Sultan sent military equipments and trainers to Kanem Borno Empire. The Ottomans played significant and major role in the training of Kanem Borno's military and they developed military cooperation. While from the religious part, when the first mosques was built in Lagos in 1894 the Ottoman state sent a special emissary to Nigeria for the decoration of the mosques, conferring the staff of office as well as the title of Bey, a higher civilian rank in the Ottoman Empire to the leader of the Southern Nigeria's Muslim community, as was in the example of Muhammad Shitta Bey (Ipek, 2010 and Ozkan, 2012:96). Therefore, basically the Ottoman Empire's relations with what is now called Nigeria were military and religious ones.

Regarding Southern Africa, the Ottoman Empire had strong and effective relations with South Africa. In 1863 the Muslim community of Cape of Good Hope (now South Africa) requested the Ottoman Empire through the Great Britain, then the area was under British control to send them an Imam that could lead them in prayer and he could be consulted on religious matters. Upon this request the Ottoman Empire sent Abu Bakr Efendi. With his arrival a strong link was built between the Muslims of South Africa and the Ottoman Empire due to his great contributions in the daily life of the Muslims particularly by teaching the Muslim community the principles of Islam. The Muslims of South Africa had actively

participated in the Hijaz railway construction campaign and their economic assistance was received by Turkey during the independence war in the 1920s (Akgun and Ozkan, 2010:531 and Ipek, 2010).

3.1.2. Modern Turkey and Sub-Saharan Africa 1923-2002

In the inter-war period (1923-1945) Turkey pursued a neutral foreign policy, but the Soviet threat under Stalin forced Turkey to the Westernization of Turkey's foreign policy during the Cold War. This unilateral orientation to the West was the most important strategic proposition of Turkish policy makers in the republican history. Therefore, the relation with other region like Sub-Saharan Africa was at the lowest level if existed at all. Other factors that contributed to this downgraded level of relations were the parties' domestic conditions; whereas in Turkey a new state was being established, Africa remained under the shadow of the late colonialism (Afacan, 2013:48 and Ozkan, 2012:96).

Turkey's first diplomatic engagement in the Post-War era was its economic assistance to Sahel region in 1948 in the under the aegis of the Islamic Conference. During the Cold War Turkey slowly began to develop relations with the Sub-Saharan Africa as a result of the decolonization process that began in 1950s.Turkey tried to form and develop political, economic and cultural relations with the newly independent countries. In 1956 Turkey opened her first official mission in Lagos Nigeria. It also recognised the independence of Ghana in 1957 and later opened a resident embassy. All these did not last long and Turkey stood aloof from African affairs, and concomitantly, despite decolonization offered proper conditions, it missed the opportunity to build permanent political, economic and cultural ties with the region (Akgun, Ozkan, 2010:531;Ipek, 2010;Ozkan, 2012:97).

Despite Turkey's opening plan in the 1970s as part of an attempt to diversify its foreign policy, many argued the plan was due to the pressure from the Western countries on Turkey

for the Cyprus problem. Indeed, the Cyprus problem of the mid 60s and 70s necessitated Turkey to look for new relations especially in the Sub-Saharan Africa. Turkey was prompted by the fact that Sub-Saharan African would support the Republic of Cyprus and its leader Makarios against Turkey in the UN General Assembly anytime the issue was put on the table. Turkey sent delegations to that region in order to express the Turkish view of the Cyprus problem (Firat, no date: 03).

Similarly, two important things also contributed to this political stand; the first was the US President Lyndon Baines Johnson's letter which implied that Turkey might not be defended in case the Soviets would attack, if it did not restrain itself in Cyprus question. The second was in 1974 when Turkey militarily intervened in Cyprus, Washington imposed arms embargo on Turkey (Afacan, 2013:48). These two important issues frustrated Turkish quest for alternative foreign policy, now that it did not received the expected support from the Western countries, especially the United States.

Unfortunately, the plan did not work and Turkey could not receive the support it expected from the Sub-Saharan Africa, the region became a forgotten once again. Until 1997 when European Union omitted Turkey's bid for full membership in the Luxembourg summit, this served as an alarm for Turkish foreign policy makers to seek for a new quests. As a result of this traumas inflicted by the European Union Turkey started to intensify its relations with Sub-Saharan Africa thereby declaring the 1998 Africa Action Plan. The plan was launched by the then Minister of Foreign Affairs Ismail Cem who spearheaded the plan that could be considered as new road map for developing Turkey and Sub-Saharan Africa relations (Ipek, 2010; Afacan, 2013:48).

Like the previous plan the 1998 Africa Action Plan did not last longer due to the some major challenges Turkey encountered both in domestic and foreign politics in the 1990s.

Domestically, Turkey for most part of the 1990s has been governed by a fragile coalition government plagued by the Islamist-Secularist polarization, pressing Kurdish question and the economic crisis that broke out in 2000. All these served as stumbling block that made 1998 Africa Action Plan could not fully implemented despite the strong desire and authenticity as well as the new foreign policy that targeted developing economic, political and commercial relations with Sub-Saharan Africa (Afacan, 2013:48).

3.1.3. Turkey and Sub-Saharan Africa during the AKP Government

With the coming of AKP to the power, Turkish foreign policy has significantly changed and new principles have started to play an important role as Turkey started to reinforce its multidimensional and active foreign policy with different continents including African Sub-Sahara. The November, 2002 election victory of AKP brought about profound changes that resulted in sidelining or eliminating of the old and established political elites. Therefore, these new foreign policy elites took concrete steps to expand the horizons of Turkish foreign policy (Afacan, 2013:49 and Siradag, 2012).

During its first two years in power, AKP prepared the Development of Economic Relations Strategy with African Countries in early 2003. However, the strategy could not be implemented because the party had to deal with some of the most vital foreign policy issues in the international arena like the Iraq War of 2003, the Cyprus problem and relations with the European Union. On the other hand, the party faced a difficult time to pursue a coherent and long-term foreign policy especially in the Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly due to the critiques of opposition on the grounds that this would be a waste of Turkey's diplomatic energy in a region with low priority.

By 2005, the AKP government to a certain level became consolidated in domestic and foreign affairs, and then looked for different opportunities. Turkey's opening to Africa came

into existence when it announced 2005 as the year of Africa. In March, 2005 Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited Ethiopia and South Africa in a historic visit, which was the first official visit by a Turkish Prime Minister to a country south of the Equator. Shortly, after his visit to Addis Ababa, Turkey was given observer status at the African Union and subsequently accredited its Ambassador to Ethiopia as the official representative to the African Union (Pham, 2010; Ozkan, 2010:534).

In 2007, the African Union invited Turkish Prime Minister to address its annual summit in Addis Ababa. In his speech Erdogan acknowledged that ''our political, economic and cultural relations are far from reflecting the existing potential between Turkey and African countries'' and promised to strengthen and develop these relations as well as to work ''to revalizes these historical friendly relations and subsequently, to bring them to the desired level'' (Pham, 2010). It seemed the speech delivered by Erdogan yielded positive result because in the following year, at the African Union summit held in Addis Ababa in January 2008 Turkey was declared a Strategic Partner and also became a non-regional member in the African Development Bank. In addition, to the progress of Turkey's institutional relations with Africa, economic relation also showed a significant development.

Under the AKP the Horn of Africa received greater attention when the Turkish Prime Minister visited Somalia in 2011. The visit was the first in 20 years for non African leader to Somalia. Erdogan travelled with his family, his Foreign Minister and an entourage of cabinet members. For observers of Turkish foreign policy the visit emphasized growing interest and engagements with Sub-Saharan Africa as part of AKP's new foreign policy activism and its efforts to develop greater relations with the whole region even where there is no stable and consolidated government like Somalia (Tank, 2013:01).

3.2. Analysis of the Turkish Foreign Policy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa At the Individual Level: The Davutoglu Factor

Although the Davutoglu's strategic depth doctrine is not on the geopolitical importance of Sub-Saharan Africa, rather it seeks to reposition Turkey from the periphery of international relations to the centre as an actor sitting at the intersection of multiple regions. However, this part will examine and explain the geopolitical importance Sub-Saharan Africa and the Turkish engagements towards Sub-Saharan Africa from the view points of Davutoglu and also some of his new Turkish foreign policy principles that are related to Sub-Saharan Africa.

3.2.1. Geopolitical importance of Sub-Saharan Africa

The changing meaning of Sub-Saharan Africa from the far away region, the region of chaos, hunger wars and diseases to a politically and economically strategic region in the new rhetoric of foreign policy makers exemplify the dynamic interaction between power and geography. According to Davutoglu these change of perception emerges due to the increasing geostrategic potential of Sub-Saharan Africa as well as a process of re-positioning, which places Turkey in wider geographical landscape or makes it part of new regions (Aras, 2009). Davutoglu further claimed that the new Turkish foreign policy helped Turkey to reach various regions in such a way that it has influence and geo-political position that made it decisive player in political and economic issues.

Davutoglu believes a rich history that a nation possesses has been an asset, which shows the potential of that nation to grow. Like the historical richness of Turkey, Davutoglu sees Mali as the centre of gold, he described the historical city of Timbuktu as miracle. He also emphasizes the bright history of Senegal alongside many Sub-Sahara African countries. If society has built a city as Timbuktu you cannot call it as least developed country. They will have even a more bright future, he believed in this like he believes in the potential of Turkey.

Because Turks feel that all these countries are their country and the destiny of these countries is their destiny.

According to Davutoglu the Gulf of Aden between the Horn of Africa and Yemen would be the most strategically important location of Africa in the future. This includes the coast of Somalia and the neighbouring countries such as Eritrea, Djibouti and Ethiopia. Stressing that almost 60 percent of world trade flows from that region and the region links to the Middle East to Sub-Saharan Africa through the Red Sea and the Mediterranean. These strategic compositions make the routes very vital in the eyes of the international community. Given the geostrategic location of the Horn, which has led some to dub it '' the naval of the world'' therefore the strategic importance of the region explained itself (Bozkurt, 2012).

The Horn of Africa had been a location of intense competition and struggle among the major world powers since fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, when Ottoman Empire played a vital role against the Portuguese expansion. Today the Turkish Republic rediscovers it due to the region's geostrategic location. In line with this, Turkey' efforts to forge diplomatic bonds has gathered its pace under the command of the Foreign Minister Davutoglu. In the end of 2011, Turkey had already reopened it embassy in Somalia and Djibouti, also planned to launch one in Eritrea (ACFRPS, 29/11/2011).

Davutoglu also links Turkey and Sub-Saharan Africa with the wider geography Turkey is located. According to him geographically Turkey and Africa share an area of the world where sea, land routes economics and people are connected with each other. This is Turkish wider neighbourhood and they are immediately affected by the developments in every part of this geography. He has argued that this is the reason why Turkey perceives that geography as integrated massive land part, so-called Afro-Eurasia. This term emphasizes the importance of standing back Euro-Centric definitions of the world and create more appropriate designations

for Turkey's strategic positioning (www.mfa.com.tr 10/11/2013). Davutoglu has further maintained that Turkey's engagement with Sub-Saharan Africa is beyond political and economic gains but Turkey has affection to assist the region in solving all associated problems the region is suffering from. In his words Turkey's policy towards Sub-Saharan Africa is not only based on carrying out its own national strategy and demonstrating its economic and political weight, but also incorporates to the former dealing with the problems of the people of Africa and sharing their fate.

Turkey's engagement to Sub-Saharan Africa, Central Asia and far East contributes to the emergence of Turkey as an influential actor in not only its close neighbourhood but also far away territories and regions. Davutoglu has pointed out that Turkey promises to contribute to security, stability and prosperity in Sub-Saharan Africa and the regions that go beyond Turkey's immediate neighbourhood. Turkey's new found interest in the region is the result of putting its self confidence in international relations, developing a universal foreign policy and seeking a leadership role in the world (Aras, 2009). He has projected that any country that can undermine the Sub-Saharan Africa would not have international standing.

3.2.2. Multidimensional Foreign Policy

The Turkish foreign policy engagement was always consistent with the vision of Ataturk's Western orientation, since he always emphasized that Turkey must be a part of the contemporary civilized world defined as the West. This was followed closely by successive Turkish governments by protecting and serving Western interest especially during the Cold War, and showed no serious interest in diversifying the Turkish foreign policy towards other global region, including Sub-Saharan Africa.

According to Davutoglu, Turkish foreign policy has long been defined, dominated and shaped by Westernised Kemalist elites, who missed the opportunities that Turkey would have

had if it pursued multidimensional foreign policy. They were also impervious to changes in domestic politics and acted on their own perception of national interest (Akgun and Ozkan, 2010:527). The Turkish foreign policy has become truly multidimensional with AKP's coming to power in 2002, which represented a new type of foreign policy makers' elites. Although the influence of Erdogan's predecessors such as Turgut Ozal and Ismail Cem, should not be underestimated in diversifying Turkish foreign policy. Reorientation of the Turkish foreign policy during the tenure of Davutoglu shifted Turkey's interest to the Sub-Saharan Africa and drove it to developing economic, political, humanitarian and educational ties without ignoring the prospect for full membership in the European Union (Ozkan, 2010:535 and Akgun & Ozkan, 2010:528).

In 2005, Turkey started to extend its interest to long neglected organizations and regions in its foreign policy such as African Union and other Sub-Saharan Africa regional organizations. By deploying its unique geopolitics, cultural identity and growing economy, Turkey is currently redefining its international identity from being a passive pro-Western state to an active, constructive global actor running multidimensional foreign policy. According to Davutoglu as the international system is no longer bipolar, Turkey considers that developing good relations with other regions beyond Europe including Sub-Saharan Africa will be beneficial. Rather than Turkey changing its direction away from the Western world, it is now pursuing multidimensional foreign policy strategies by developing ties with Sub-Saharan Africa (Ozkan, 2010:536).

3.2.3. Active Involvement in Global and Regional Organizations

Although, it is difficult if not impossible for a particular country to have full relations with all the countries of the world by establishing diplomatic, economic and socio-cultural ties. Such a country could develop relations with international and regional governmental organization,

where those organizations serve as platform through which member countries discuss and develop multilateral relations with non-member countries. Turkey as a global actor sees its engagement with global and regional organizations as an opportunity to be present where critical issues are being debated.

After the first historic visit of Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan to the Sub-equatorial Africa, Turkey obtained the observer status in the African Union on April 12, 2005 and Turkey was accepted as a non-regional member of the African Development Bank in 2008. Turkey also became a member of the Inter-governmental Authority on Development Partners Forum (IGAD) in 2008. In 2005, also Turkish embassy in Abuja Nigeria was accredited to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Furthermore, in 2010 the Turkish embassy in Darussalam was accredited to the East African Community (EAC) (Siradag, 2012 and Aras, 2009). These reinforced Turkish institutional ties with African Union and Sub-Saharan regional organizations.

However, declaration of Turkey by the African Union as a strategic partner is very significant considering the current challenges of the international environment. Siradag (2012) argued that the main reason behind this is that, the world has changed as a multipolar international system and replaced a bipolar one with the collapsed of the Soviet Union. The concept of security has dramatically changed and transformed from military to non-military threats, such as climate change, international terrorism and illegal migration which increasingly has come to threaten all states economic and political interests. Therefore, no state can resolve today's global issues and challenges on its own. And as a changing nature of foreign policy, Turkey wants to play more active role alongside African Union in resolving these issues globally.

3.2.4. Turkish Mediation in Sub-Saharan Africa

Mediation is one of the basic tenets of the active rather than reactive foreign policy engagement of Turkey's AKP government. According to Ahmet Davutoglu if there are crises in Turkey's surroundings, it will not wait until the tension becomes high and escalates into the level of military confrontation. This principle also becomes visible in Turkish relations with Sub-Saharan Africa. This signified that the principle is not restricted to only close geographical regions of Turkey. Ahmet Davutoglu has so far mediated a number of internal and external conflicts in Sub-Sahara African countries. Therefore as Turkey advances its relations with Sub-Saharan Africa, it will be very difficult for the country to exclude itself out of the region's internal conflict and political problems.

Turkey's active engagement in the crises in the region can be exemplified by looking at a variety of the cases. When the crisis broke in the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia between the former president Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmad and then Prime Minister Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmake which spent the week of preceding quarrelling, dismissing and reappointing the latter, the mediation meeting was convened neither in New York, headquarter of the United Nations nor in the Addis Ababa, the seat of the African Union. Rather the three day high level mediation meeting was hosted in Istanbul Turkey and parties sought for reconciliation under aegis of the Foreign Minister Davutoglu (Pham, 2010).

Turkey also took a useful step in the mediating dispute between Sudan and South Sudan. Turkey wanted to use its advantageous position of having friendly relations with Sudan to mediate the long protracted conflict between the two neighbouring countries. Speaking after their meeting with Turkish Prime Minister, the South Sudanese Ambassador to Turkey John Gai Yoh emphasized that Turkey through its Foreign Minister shows its ability to mediate the conflict. He however, called on the cooperation of the parties involved so that the Turkey's

positive relations with Sudan and South Sudan would be useful in mediating the two African countries (Donat, 2013).

Moreover, at the request of Eritrea, the Turkish Foreign Minister also travelled to Asmara to help to reconcile the Eritrean regime and the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia. In his visit to Somalia on 16 November, 2012 Ahmet Davutoglu had talks with Somalia President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud. The Eritrean government was suffering from the United Nations sanctions for its support to the Al-Qaida link group Al-Shabab and destabilizing the Somali government, a political stand which soured bilateral relations with its close neighbour (Gedab News, 2012).

3.2.5. Developing Relations with Neighbouring Regions and Beyond

After the AKP accession to power in 2002, Turkey's foreign policy opening towards long-neglected regions has been gaining more prominence and diversity. Turkey aimed to develop intensive foreign relations beyond its close neighbourhood, by looking to the premise of far away geographical regions like Sub-Saharan Africa. This region was considered before as distant geographical area of land full of problems, hunger, disease and civil war. With the coming of AKP the Turkish government established close diplomatic, economic and socio-cultural ties with the region based on rational calculations (Davutoglu, 2008:10).

Therefore, the Sub-Saharan Africa after decades of isolation in Turkey's foreign policy, it now returned to its attention with its rising strategic and economic importance, which makes Turkey to show closer economic and political interest towards the region. As Ozkan argued until recently, it was inconceivable that Turkey might show a deep interest in Sub-Saharan Africa. Nor was it thinkable that a Turkish Foreign Minister would attach particular importance to the region within the context of new foreign policy (Ozkan, 2010:533).

3.3. State Level: The Roles of State Actors and Non-governmental Organizations in Turkey and Sub-Saharan Africa Relations

In this context, the roles played by Turkish governmental and non-governmental civil society organizations as well as trade and business associations in strengthening and developing economic, educational, political, social and humanitarian ties with Sub-Saharan Africa will be examined. It is important to note that since the accessions of AKP into power in 2002 Turkish civil society organization have increasing opportunities to play their roles in foreign policy matters. The space below is allotted to the activities and economic, political and socio-cultural impacts of the involved organizations.

3.3.1. Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists (TUSKON)

TUSKON is a non-governmental businessmen organization established by regional federation in Istanbul in 2005, and gradually reached out to the other part of Turkey. TUSKON has succeeded in bringing Sub-Saharan businessmen to Turkey and encouraging Turkish businessmen to expand to the whole of Africa. TUSKON is an umbrella organization under which thousands of Anatolian companies of different scale come together. Between 2006 and 2010 it channelled more than five thousand small and medium-sized Turkish entrepreneurs to various Sub-Saharan African countries as part of its market exploration (Bacik and Afacan, 2013:496). The rise of so-called "Anatolian Tigers" heralded that Turkey had now a considerable accumulation of capital that could be channelled to different markets. Of course, one of the reasons of this constant search for markets is primarily to survive and develop into global companies It can be said those companies' rigor to open to and sell their products to the African and Middle Eastern markets where they could compete with other firms has also influenced the course of the Turkish foreign policy of the last decade.

Most of the Turkish firms under TUSKON that are in trade with Sub-Saharan African countries are medium-sized companies mainly representing the newly emerged conservative bourgeoisie. After a short while TUSKON succeeded in organizing five high-level summits between Turkish and the Sub-Saharan African ministers and businessmen to promote trade between them. These meetings have started taking place since 2006 a year after the birth of the organization with increasing participation in each meeting (Ozkan 2013:45 and Bacik, Afacan, 2013:496).

The first foreign trade meeting organised by TUSKON was in May 8-9, 2006 with the theme ''Turkey–Africa foreign trade bridge'' whereby a total of 500 businessmen from 35 different countries of Sub-Saharan Africa and 1000 businessmen from Turkey attended. At the meeting 40,000 bilateral meetings were held between Turkish and Sub-Saharan participants. The meeting offered an opportunity to bargain and strike business between Turkish and their counterparts (Uchera, 2008:54). The second meeting was held in May 2007 under the same theme, but with participation of a higher number of businessmen and bureaucrats (around 800 from each side) compared with the previous one. The new rounds of meetings were held in2008, 2009, and 2010 with the participation 1000, 1,200 and 1,300 businessmen from both Turkey and Sub-Saharan Africa respectively.

All the meetings were opened by the State Minister for Trade alongside Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs. It was in one of the meeting that then Turkish Foreign Minister announced Turkish decision to open 11 new embassies in Sub-Saharan Africa. The main aim of these meetings was to analyze the issues that were related to economic cooperation, development aid and investment opportunities between Turkey and African Sub-Sahara and to provide necessary information for a closer cooperation (Guney, 2011:03).

TUSKON has also organized trade and investment expeditions to potentially viable countries such as Kenya, Tanzania, Democratic Congo, Cameroon, Nigeria and Ghana in 2009, 2010 and 2011 respectively as follow up to trade bridge programs. Most of delegations were led by the President of Turkey or relevant Turkish cabinet members. Similarly, TUSKON invited a group of Nigerian businessmen to Corum, a Turkish city known for its nationalist persuasion and having poor links with the global markets (Uchera, 2008:55; Bacik & Afacan, 2013:496). The pioneering role of TUSKON has not only been to bring Sub-Saharan Africa in developing relations with Turkey but also to create avenue for both sides to explore cooperation and to provide their respective political leaders with platforms to interacts and establish governmental formal relations.

3.3.2. Gulen Movement (*Hizmet*)

The activities of Gulen movement have certainly adds to the increasing profile and visibility of Turkey as a result of its proactive foreign policy and unprecedented economic success in recent years. Hizmet has become important component of Turkey's soft power in Sub-Saharan Africa. Education, inter confessional dialogue and charitable activities formed the part of Hizmet's voluntary duty as emphasized by Gulen. According to him educating rationality should be the way to reach a critical, thus true faith. Therefore, education is at the centre of the Gulen project (Angey 2012, Pandya and Gallagher, 2012 and Global post, 2013). This explains why the Gulen Movement has established schools in more than 70 countries, and more than 20 schools in Sub-Saharan Africa.

In the early 1990s, schools operated by adherents of Gulen teaching began to spring up across Sub-Saharan Africa. The Gulen Movement considered the region as a priority area for the past decade. This makes the movement to devote its largest share of human and financial resources to the establishment of various educational centres, high schools, universities and

campus resident halls. The Gulen movement's activities have been the driving forces behind many of new relationships between Turkey and Sub-Saharan Africa over the past years. Even though the potential market opportunity for Turkey in the region and new economic potentials lured the attention of Turkish policy makers, it was indeed the movement with its establishment and successes on the region that inspired Ankara to turn to Africa Sub-Sahara (Balci, 2014). This is to the fact that even before the AKP administration accession to power, Gulenists had already opened schools in Africa, using the same model and strategy that had worked elsewhere.

The Turkish ambassador to Kenya, Tuncer Kayalar showed its support to school projects notably by participating to conferences called "Interfaith Dialogue and Gulen Thought" in May 2011. Similarly, Abdullah Gul the President of Turkish Republic opened a Gulen based Light Academy Secondary School during his diplomatic visit here in 2008. The Turkish schools in Kenya succeeded in 2010 in organizing diplomatic trip for Kenyan Members of Parliament to Istanbul and Ankara to meet with their Turkish counterparts. This shows how Gulen schools contributed in developing diplomatic relation between Turkey and Kenya, and sometimes served as an intermediate to lobby for Turkey (Angey,2012). The schools also become an opportunity for Sub-Saharan Africa students to get Gulen's scholarship and Turkish government as well.

Moreover, while paying an official visit to Kampala, Uganda Turkey's Deputy Prime Minister and State Minister Bulent Arinc noted that the Turkish schools opening in various Sub-Saharan African countries contributed significantly in the development of ties between Turkey and those countries where these schools are in operation. He further stated that the relations between Turkey and Africa were multifaceted one which included cooperation in trade, investment, traditions and culture as well as in education. Accordingly, the activities of the Light Academy in Uganda contributed significantly to Turkey's rising foreign policy

prospects and the acceleration in the diplomatic ties between the two countries. Also described the presence of Turkish teachers as blessing to Turkish businessmen, because they acted as translators for them since they had already laid the infrastructure by creating an environment of confidence for politicians and businessmen (www.fethullah-gulen.org 02/02/2014).

According to Celik who worked in Gulen-inspired schools in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Afghanistan before going to Somalia '' our schools are a bridge between countries, bridges of education, bridges of culture, bridges of economy. There is nothing inherently sinister about the Gulen networks operations in Sub-Saharan Africa''. He further emphasized that the Gulen schools were simply the Turkish way of breaking ground in a region where they did not have the longstanding presence and automatic influence of bigger, wealthier countries. Their presence paved the way for the establishing ties between Turkey and the country in which they settled.

3.3.3. The Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA)

This agency was founded initially to help in the transition of Balkans, Caucasus and Central Asian countries. However, after 2003, it transformed into a more global aid agency and expanded its area of operations. One of the regions that this expansion showed itself has been Sub-Saharan Africa region. The first TIKA coordination office was opened in 2005 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia followed by Khartoum, Sudan in 2006 and Dakar, Senegal in 2007. Through these three strategically located offices TIKA has operated and implemented projects in 37 Sub-Saharan Africa and provided technical assistance to those benefiting countries as well (Ozkan, 2012:121, Akgun and Ozkan 2010:537).

TIKA project and activities in Sub-Saharan Africa are designed for long-term purposes such as the construction of social infrastructure like schools, hospitals and roads. TIKA also

responds to the immediate needs of the people in the region such that vocational training courses are organized in Turkey or in partner country in specific sectors. TIKA also constructs boreholes and project assistance in the fight against diseases. Besides, TIKA's development strategy in Sub-Saharan Africa is based on technical assistance, sharing experience in areas such as agriculture and technology transfer in order to bridge the gap between developed and underdeveloped countries (TIKA 10/02/2014 and Ozkan, 2010b:537). As part of this in 2008 TIKA initiated program called African Agricultural Development Programme to be implemented in 13 Sub-Saharan countries namely: Burkina Faso, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Senegal, Comoros, Madagascar, Tanzania, Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda with the aim of modernizing and promoting agriculture in those countries (Ozkan, 2011:123).

Therefore, the activities and projects of TIKA have no doubt increased and promoted the visibility of Turkey in Sub-Saharan Africa and function as a corollary to the Turkish foreign policy objectives. In general, the Sub-Saharan Africa programs of TIKA mainly concentrated on agriculture, healthcare, education and roads construction. President Gul argued that Turkey attempted to build relations with Sub-Saharan Africa by taking health, education, agriculture, environment and capacity building as strategic areas to take action (Basenyo and Olah, 2012:146).

3.3.4. Humanitarian Aid Activities

With the accession of AKP to power in 2002 Turkish humanitarian activities towards Sub-Saharan Africa gathered pace. In 2012, Turkey gave more than 1billion dollar as humanitarian aid, making it the fourth-largest donor in the world. The projection of soft power in Turkish foreign policy could be regarded as the factor behind this new engagement. Turkey has been increasingly involved in foreign economic and humanitarian assistance to

Sub-Saharan Africa. The increasing humanitarian assistance of Turkey elevated it to the status of an emerging donor country position. The assistance is in form of disaster relief, emergency aid and donations through Turkey's voluntary contribution to the United Nations agencies (Kalaycioglu, 2011:1292).

In the last five years Turkey through the World Health Organization (WHO), World Food Programme (WFP) and the Red Crescent donated over 7.5m Dollars to various Africa Sub-Saharan countries to assist them in coping with the negative effects of drought and other related natural disaster problems. In the same vein, Turkey has also allocated 50 million dollars to development projects in Sub-Saharan countries for the next five years. In 2007 Turkey hosted for the first time a summit of the Least Developed Countries in Istanbul, out of 49 countries that attended the summit 33 are located in Africa Sub-Sahara. At the summit Turkey announced that it committed 20 million dollars of development aid for these countries (Ozkan, 2010:538).

These active participations of Turkey in the fight against poverty and the humanitarian problem are the part of Turkey's new foreign policy supported by soft power. In the Fourth UN Conference on Least Developed Countries, held in Istanbul on 9-13 May, 2011 the Foreign Minister of Turkey Ahmet Davutoglu stated that the conference created another opportunity of cooperation between Turkey and Africa Sub-Sahara and announced that Turkey will be allocating 200 million dollars to the LDCs each year starting from the year 2012 for humanitarian aid and technical cooperation projects.

Turkey has also took a lead to help the war torn Somalia, when in August 2011 Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan travelled with his family and his cabinet to highlight the plight of about 12 million Somalian victims of drought. Erdogan raised 115 million dollars of humanitarian relief. The Turkish Red Crescent distributed food and opened refugee camp to

help those victims (Ford, 2012:38 and Tank, 2013:2). Turkish Foreign Minister Davutoglu at the visit told BBC World Service that ''we came to Somalia to show our solidarity with the brothers and sisters of Somalia, but this is not just for one day, we will continue to work for our brothers and sisters and we will never leave them alone. There was a perception that nobody can go to Mogadishu, we try to destroy the perception. We came, many others can come'' (Ford, 2012:38). Davutoglu reiterated his country's desire to maintain this relation no matter what it would take Turkey, unlike the Western countries that often go and leave.

Following this historic visit Prime Minister Erdogan described the Somalia humanitarian crisis as global shame, surprised that thousands of people would starve to death in Twenty First Century. Echoing Turkish unique foreign policy approach, Turkey has assumed moral responsibility to tackle the humanitarian crisis in Somalia and region as a whole. When he addressed the United Nations General Assembly, Prime Minister Erdogan drew the attention of the world leaders and donor countries to the degree and the extent of the famine and urged the UN General Assembly to call on international community to quickly send humanitarian assistance to the Somali people (Ali, 2011:67; Gullo, 2012:6).

Turkey painstakingly avoided the neo-colonialist label that marked other foreign Western powers active in Sub-Saharan Africa, and it embarked upon dealing with many infrastructural problems that most Western countries have failed to solve. On the other hand, some argued in the long-term Turkey would benefit from trading with Somalia because of its geostrategic importance with longest seaboard in Africa and its position at the centre of major trading routes. In addition, surveys suggest that Somalia has large amount of oil reserve in north eastern Putland (Sanei, 2013; Harte, 2012). Whatever the case, Turkey has demonstrated its commitment by executing many projects that are important in the well-being of the Somalian society.

3.3.5. Economy: Trade and Investment Relations

Turkey's engagement economically towards Sub-Saharan Africa is rooted in four economic-related issues: globalization, the activities of business organizations, Turkey's economic development and the 2008 global economic crisis. The current globalization has rendered distance insignificant and countries have become more liberalized since the end of Cold War, which proved the victory of capitalism on communism. The security based foreign policy is diminishing while economic one is rising, therefore globalization necessitates Turkey to expand it ties economically to even previously distance places like Sub-Saharan Africa. The activities of business organizations are associated with the rise of ambitious small and medium sized Anatolian tigers that are constantly searching for new markets to survive. Considering the higher population and potential market in Sub-Saharan Africa these businessmen under TUSKON invited and organized several trade meetings with Sub-Saharan Africa businessmen (Afacan and Bacik, 2013:485).

Turkish economy is among the fastest growing economies in the world and depends on an export-oriented economic strategy. 2008 saw a serious global economic crisis that stalled growth of economy, particularly in the Western countries who are the major trade partners of Turkey. Consequently, Turkey was also affected but not as much as the Western countries. This drove Turkey look for other markets for its products. Turkey's non-regional membership in the African Development Bank is greatly boosting Turkey's economic ties with African countries by giving Turkey opportunity to finance so many developmental projects in the region (Albayrak, 2012). The geographical proximity and Turkey's historical ties with certain African countries were also crucial factors to the development of economic and commercial relations (Kizilarslan, no date: 19). According to Ulusoy (1998) the Turkish goods were traded in the streets of northern Nigeria's city of Kano even during the Ottoman era.

According to Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu at the Ministerial Review Conference of Africa-Turkey Partnership; Turkey was eager to place greater focus on economic cooperation with Africa, spur growth and willing to accomplish these goals through a decentralized, multifactor foreign policy. He reiterated Turkish ambition of developing ties with Sub-Saharan Africa that would be as important as Turkey's ties with Western countries. Turkey has everything to gain from ever closer interaction with the most affluent nations in the world that carryout most of their economic activities among themselves. Turkey would prefer them to grow as strong economic entities and will not let itself to play the role of peripheral attachments to far away economic centres (www.mfa.gov.tr and Kimer, 2011).

Similarly, Ahmet Davutoglu speaking at the opening of the sectoral assessment meeting on African strategies announced that since 2005 trade and economic ties with Sub-Saharan Africa were flourishing. Turkey established joint economic commissions with 23 countries and joint business council with 17 countries, free trade agreement with 4 countries, agreements for the avoidance of double-taxation with eight countries, agreement on reciprocal promotion of investments with 10 countries were signed. Therefore, Turkey aimedto create and increase economic interdependence with countries and territories of Sub-Saharan Africa by means of trade agreements, joint economic commission and all treaties which facilitated economic relations from trade to investments (www.mfa.gov.tr and Kalaycioglu, 2011:1293).

Furthermore, the trade between Turkey and Sub-Saharan Africa has been evolving by gaining acceleration, since the year 2004. Turkey's economic engagement in Sub-Saharan Africa could therefore reflect on trade figures:

Table 1: Turkey's trade with Sub-Saharan Africa (2004-2013)

Year	Export (Dollar)	Import (Dollar)	Total (Dollar)
2004	764,791	1,428,470	2,193,261
2005	1,086,849	1,632,270	2,719,119
2006	1,469,127	2,233,388	3,702,515
2007	1,946,661	2,821,104	4,767,765
2008	3,212,341	2,060,486	5,272,827
2009	2,738,866	1,700,198	4,439,064
2010	2,257,898	1,725,916	3,983,814
2011	3,633,016	3,424,658	7,057,674
2012	3,913,246	2,613,447	6,526,693
2013	4,104,697	2,522,630	6,627,327

Source: Turkish Statistical Institutewww.turkstat.gov.tr(01/03/2014)

From the table 1, above as illustrated, the volume of trade between Turkey and Sub-Saharan Africa was just 2.1 billion dollars in 2004, it reached highest amount of 7billion dollars in 2011. In this period the trade volume between these two sides increased more than 3 times. one of the most important moment for Turkey-Sub-Saharan Africa trade relations was between 2010 when the figure stood at 3.9 billion dollars and almost double to 7 billion dollars in 2011. Although, the years that followed witnessed a slight decrease in the volume of trade, in 2012 it dropped to 6.5 billion dollars, while in 2013 it registered a slight increase to 6.6 billion dollars. Another important point is that, despite the world economic crisis in 2008, their trade did not lose its pace so much. In 2008 it stood at 5.2 billion and dropped a little to 4.4 billion dollars in 2009.

Table 2: Turkey's trade (export) with top ten Sub-Saharan Africa countries (2001-2012)

S/N	Countries	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
1	Angola	6,534	8,328	9,508	13,475	24,109	31,682	44,396	63,914	40,828	50,595	66,996	74,000
2	Sudan	1,699	1,949	2,542	3,778	4,824	5,657	8,879	11,671	8,257	11,404	9,694	3,368
3	Congo	2,055	2,280	2,677	3,433	4,745	6,078	5,635	8,325	6,100	9,300	11,500	10,700
4	Equatorial Guinea	1,735	2,117	2,801	4,599	7,064	8,207	10,210	15,218	9,100	10,000	13,500	15,500
5	Gabon	2,524	2,409	3,062	3,728	5,065	5,450	6,309	9,566	5,356	8,686	12,000	9,665
6	Ghana	1,716	1,850	2,324	2,450	2,802	3,727	4,195	5,270	5,840	7,960	12,542	13,000
7	Ivory Coast	3,946	5,275	5,788	6,919	7,697	8,477	8,669	10,390	11,327	11,555	12,542	12,350
8	Botswana	2,510	2,425	2,810	3,513	4,425	4,529	5,174	4,951	3,456	4,693	5,882	5,971
9	Nigeria	18,045	17,975	24,031	38,631	50,467	58,726	66,606	86,274	56,742	84,000	114,500	116,000
10	S/Africa	29,258	29,723	36,482	46,146	51,626	58,175	68,784	80,784	61,677	80,892	98,047	87,256
	Total	70,019	74,331	92,025	126,672	162,824	190,708	228,857	296,363	208,683	279,085	344,661	347,810

source: Turkey Ministry of Economy www.ekonomi.gov.tr (23/04/2014)

The table above illustrated the trade figures of Turkey's export to top ten Sub-Saharan Africa countries. The amount of the export in 2001 was stood at only 70 million dollars but reached 347 million dollars in 2012. The interesting thing about this, is that since 2001 the figures are increasing dramatically. It was only in 2008 when the figure was 296 million dollars and then dropped to 208 million dollars in 2009. Beside this period, the subsequent three years witnessed an increased in the level of export to these ten countries from 279 million dollars to 344 million dollars and 347 million dollars in 2010, 2011 and 2012 respectively. However, among these ten countries Nigeria was the leading country for Turkish export to Sub-Saharan Africa from 2001-2012 at the tune of 731.9 million dollars and followed by South Africa at the tune of 728.8 million dollars. The total amount of Turkey's export to these top ten countries from 2001-2012 was 2 billion dollars.

Table 3: Turkey's trade (import) with top ten Sub-Saharan Africa countries (2001-2012)

S/N	Countries	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
1	Angola	3,179	3,760	5,480	5,832	5,353	8,778	13,661	20,982	22,660	16,667	20,229	24,000
2	Ethiopia	1,811	1,594	2,686	2,874	4,095	5,207	5,809	8,277	7,668	8,602	8,896	12,656
3	Ghana	3,154	2,720	3,210	4,074	5,347	6,754	8,061	10,269	8,046	10,922	15,968	18,000
4	Ivory Coast	2,548	2,599	3,279	4,715	5,865	5,820	6,683	7,884	6,960	7,849	6,720	9,777
5	Kenya	3,192	3,245	3,725	4,553	5,846	7,233	8,989	11,128	10,202	12,093	14,782	16,290
6	Nigeria	11,586	7,547	10,853	14,164	20,754	26,523	34,830	49,951	33,906	44,235	56,000	51,000
7	Botswana	1,809	1,845	2,448	3,231	3,161	3,086	4,067	5,211	4,728	5,657	7,272	8,025
8	S/Africa	28,248	29,267	39,748	53,466	62,304	78,715	88,450	101,640	74,054	94,226	121,606	124,245
9	Sudan	1,958	2,446	2,882	4,075	6,757	8,074	8,775	9,352	9,691	10,045	9,236	9,475
10	Tanzania	1,712	1,660	2,125	2,726	3,287	4,246	5,337	7,703	6,149	7,531	10,799	11,346
	Total	59,197	56,683	76,436	99,710	122,769	154,436	184,662	232,397	184,064	237,769	271,508	284,814

Source: Turkish Ministry of Economy. www.ekonomi.gov.tr (23/04/2014)

From the table 3 above as illustrated are the top ten Sub-Saharan Africa countries that Turkey had imported from between 2001-2012. Turkey's import from these countries stood at only 59 million dollars, the trend was similar to trade export trade. Since 2001 the import level was increased and reached 284 million dollars in 2012. There are three countries that did not appeared in the top ten countries of Turkey export but they appear in import trade which include: Ethiopia, Kenya and Tanzania. Unlike in the export trade South Africa was the top exporter to Turkey in the region from 2001-2012 at the tune of 895.9 million dollars and then followed by Nigeria at the tune of 361.3 million dollars. The total amount of Turkey's import from these top ten countries stood at 1.9 billion dollars. This shows that there was no much gap between import and export trade within this period.

As regards investments, many Turkish firms currently operating in Sub-Saharan Africa, their sectors includes textiles and apparel, automotive and industrial supplies, household utilities, chemicals food, construction materials, trade and transportation. It is believed that Turkey's investment in the region exceed 4 billion dollars in the last five years (Karayol, no date: 02). This year also the Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and industrialists of Turkey (TUSKON) announced to invest up to 400 million dollars in eastern Sub-Saharan Africa. The plan was aired at the closure of the Turkey-East Africa trade meeting Trade Bridge held in Gaziantep Turkey. President of TUSKON Riza Nur Meral said; "Turkish investors are very much interested at the large and growing of East African Community market with its vast population. We will be targeting construction of infrastructures, energy, mining and agro processing among many other sectors" (Gashumba, 2014).

3.4. System Level: Turkey and Sub-Saharan Africa Relations

This part of the chapter aims to deal with the nature of Turkey and Sub-Saharan Africa relations in the international level. The first ever Turkey-Africa summit is to be examined, which can be regarded as the solid ground for the flourishing of ties between Turkey and Africa Sub-Saharan region.

3.4.1. Turkey-Africa 2008 Cooperation Summit

The summit was held under the auspices of the Turkish President Abdullah Gul, with the theme '' Solidarity and Partnership for a Common Future'' from 18-21 August, 2008, in Istanbul. In this summit 49 countries participated: 6 presidents, 5vice presidents, 7 prime ministers, 1 deputy prime minister, 14 foreign ministers, 12ministers, 11 international and regional organizations representative including the African Union and hundreds of business community were also present (Orsam, 2012:10 and Akgun and Ozkan 2010a:536). The summit unanimously accepted and adopted two documents which were prepared by senior experts and ministers: '' The Istanbul Declaration on Turkey-Africa Partnership: Cooperation and Solidarity for a Common Future'' and ''Cooperation Framework for Turkey-Africa Partnership''. The framework document reads:

> "Acknowledging the critical role that trade and investment should play within the framework of this partnership as agents of development.... and we pledge to create a favourable legal and stimulating business environment for economic cooperation as central pillar of the Africa-Turkey partnership (Ozkan, 2012:23)."

The document further identified a range of area of cooperation between Turkey and African countries. They were determined to boost these intergovernmental cooperation, trade and investment, agricultural trade, rural development, water resources management, small and medium sized enterprises, health, peace, security and cooperation by complying with principles of international law, democracy, human rights, media, information technology and environment (Wheeler, 2011:48;Kalaycioglu, 2011:1290). In accordance with the provisions

and in order to follow the implementation of the decisions taken in the summit, it was resolved to hold a senior officials meeting in the second year after the summit, ministerial review conference in the third year and Turkey-Africa cooperation summit in an African country in the fifth year.

Meanwhile, out of this summit the immediate benefit for Turkey and African countries could be deduced. Firstly, the summit served as an avenue at which the Turkish President and Prime Minister met with the delegations from several African countries at the same time. As he puts it in a press meeting that the Turkish President had bilateral talks with the head of delegations of 42 countries within the scope of the summit. Given that neither Turkey nor many African countries know much about one another, the summit helped in overcoming some difficulties in developing ties between them. Secondly, during the summit Turkey sought the support of African countries for its candidature at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) non-permanent seat for 2009-2010. In October 2008 Turkey secured their support and it was elected to the council with 151 votes (Akgun and Ozkan, 2010a:536).

While in the same vein, there are long term benefits of the summit. First, Turkey and African countries are seriously engaging to expand and increase their trade relation. They hope to actualize this by establishing Turkey-Africa Chamber a joint union formed out of Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges (TOBB) and the Union of African Chambers of Commerce, Industry, Agriculture and Profession (UACCIAP). Second, Turkey promised to increase its financial aid to Africa both through international agencies and its own official aid agency TIKA. Third, Turkey and African countries decided to open new additional embassies. According to Turkish official by 2010 they intend to open eight Turkish resident embassies making them 20 (Orsam, 2012:13; Ozkan, 2012b:92). This cooperation is considerable and both have to work hard towards actualizing the common future of prosperity for the two sides.

3.4.2. Political Relations

To examine the political relation between Turkey and Sub-Saharan Africa one should give account on the increase of diplomatic ties and high level of government official visits to each side, and their relation in the international organization like United Nations. Since the AKP came to power there are multiple increases in the number of Turkish embassies in Sub-Saharan Africa. As at 2008 there were only ten Turkish embassies in the region out of them those in Accra/Ghana, Mogadishu/Somalia and Darussalam/Tanzania were closed due to economic or security reasons (Hazar, 2012:11).

From 2009-2012 Turkey has successfully opened nineteen embassies in the Sub-Saharan Africa, sixteen are new opened ones while three embassies of Tanzania, Ghana and Somalia were reopened in 2009, 2010 and 2011 respectively. By 2013 the number of Turkey's embassies in the Sub-Saharan African has increased to thirty this could be regarded as formal reinforcement of Turkey's political presence. While on the other hand, there are increases in the number of Sub-Saharan Africa embassies in Ankara, the number of those embassies increased from eleven to twenty seven in the last five years. This shows how countries of the region are committed to reciprocate in terms of building and maintaining sound diplomatic ties which is blossoming. In addition, some of the Sub-Sahara African countries have developed a friendship groups between the Turkish Grand National Assembly and the parliaments of Nigeria, Ghana, Sudan and Tanzania. The aim of the group is to contribute towards bilateral relation of their respective countries (Afacan, 203:51; Hazar, 2012:11).

In terms of high level diplomatic visits, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu stressed the importance of these visits when speaking at the Africa-Turkey Partnership Ministerial Review Conference. According to Davutoglu the bilateral relations between Turkey and Sub-Saharan African Countries gained considerable momentum, high level visits between

presidents, prime ministers and foreign affairs ministers from both sides dramatically increased. Turkey is committed to extend the web of representation to every country in the region and preferred to be represented directly (www.mfa.gov.tr 10/11/2013).

Turkey's observer status in the African Union in 2005 and strategic partner in 2008, which is the most important organization of the continent, to which all African countries are members and where issues regarding Africa are discussed directly at the highest level were fruitful outcome of it political relation with African countries. Turkey's non-permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) during 2008-2010 could be regarded as such. In this period Turkey attained the opportunity to take part in the most important decision-making body of the United Nations by receiving the votes of 151 countries. It is obvious that Turkey's membership at the Security Council was backed by African countries. While relating Turkey's non-permanent membership to the Security Council and its political ties with African countries, Turkish ambassador to the United Nations Ertugrul Apakan argued:

> "We approached to the problems of Africa as if we are an African country. We became a Security Council member that tried to understand and solve the problems of the member countries from a wider perspective. We endeavoured to become a country that strived to form a consensus as well. We acted in line with the idea of contributing to stability peace and strengthening of the UN. We developed significant dialogues through the activities we carried out in the Sub-Saharan countries....Turkey's efficient and active foreign policy increased the attention towards Turkey (Afacan, 2013:15)."

The membership had brought Turkey closer to many Sub-Saharan countries under the same organization and helped Turkey to break perceived isolation in certain crisis riddled issues such as Cyprus problem, the issue which had not been well understood in Sub-Saharan countries, at least from the view point of Turkey.

3.4.3. Military and Security relations

Turkey and Sub-Saharan Africa relations are not only limited to political and economic ones, in terms of security they established understandable relations as well. Since the terrorist attack on the United States the international actors such as United States, European Union and United Nations paid more attention to Sahel region and Horn of Africa where Islamist linked to Al Qaeda had presence. They heighted that collapsed states like Somalia, conflict and wars and international terrorism would not only threaten economic and political interests of the Sub-Saharan Africa but also could damage the interests of global actors. This new global threats and challenges necessitated global actors to have a strategic partnership with African Union (Siradag, 2102).

In this regards, Turkey also followed their suit and it was declared strategic partner of Africa in 2008. Turkey started to established military and security ties with different countries in the Sub-Saharan Africa. The number of already existing technical, scientific and military training related treaties have reached by four; i.e.; with Somalia, Ghana, Gambia and Mali, and will probably increase in the near future. Turkey also provides education for gendarme in several Saharan countries. Similarly high level military delegates have already had several meetings about the form of potential cooperation in Nigeria, Cameroon and Kenya. In terms of markets for military and security equipment, the Turkish military industry noticed the African market. For instance, at the biyearly organized military exhibitions a lot of African deputizes their homeland. Among the approximately 200 Turkish companies dealing with protecting military sector, Sub-Saharan Africa is a much more attracting market (Basenyo and Olah, 2012:145).

At the Horn of Africa Turkey is also playing a major security role against the Somalia pirate activities in the Aden-Bay, the Turkish navy secured the routes for the traders' off the region , it could have been dangerous if not impossible for them to pass by. After the United Nations

proclaimed, the Turkish frigate called Giresun started its duty on 25 February, 2009 as part of the United Nations led Combine Task Force (CTF) 151 a multinational naval force carrying out anti-piracy operation off the coast of Somalia. It activities was later taken over by another frigates called Gediz and Gokova. In effect, this security activity was not limited to the ocean, but it contributed and tried to claim relative peace in Somalia. Turkey currently deploys military and police personnel in support of five United Nations peacekeeping missions in Africa, which includes: the Un mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), the hybrid UN-AU mission in Darfur (UNAMID), the UN mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and the UN mission in Ivory Coast (ONUCI) (Siradaq, 2012;Basenyo and, Olah 2012: 146).

3.4.4. Socio-Cultural Relations

In terms of socio-cultural relation between Turkey and Sub-Saharan Africa, not much has been established this is overshadowed by political and economic relations. Culturally, Turkey possesses enormous amount of affinity and common parameters with African peoples and nations. Ahmet Davutoglu when addressing Turkey-Africa Partnership Ministerial Review Conference noted that, the culture and civilization which flourished on Turkey and African territories have left countless common words, religions, music, tradition and pattern of thinking. From what he experienced, Davutoglu described Africans as friendly nations in Turkey and Turks are embraced in African countries with open arms, cordially and amicably.

However, the little number of inter cultural marriages also played their part in developing socio-cultural relations between Turkey and Sub-Saharan Africa. Although the number of Turkish communities in the Africa Sub-Sahara is very small compared to the influx of African students into the Turkish universities in recent years, whether on scholarship or self-sponsored education. Some of the African students are married to Turkish men or women and

some are either residing in Turkey or have taken back their spouse to Africa. This is greatly contributing to the developing socio-cultural ties between their countries (Uchera, 2008:59).

Adding a religious dimension to this, religion comprise subtle but highly important elements of Turkey and Sub-Saharan Africa relation with the coming of conservative Islamist AKP led government. The Directorate for Religious Affairs (*Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı*) in Turkey until recently has assumed a limited role in foreign policy and focused solely on the domestic religious needs of Muslims. With change towards multidimensional approach to foreign policy, for Turkey religion has become one of the tools of engagement with the Muslims communities of Sub-Saharan Africa. Diyanet organised religious leaders meetings in 2006 and 2011 in Istanbul and Ankara respectively. At the meeting Turkey reiterated its commitments towards taking a greater role in Islamic education in African Muslims communities. In a joint declaration they saw educational institution similar to the Imam Hatip schools in Turkey should be used as an example in African countries. In terms of religion Turkey becomes unique in comparison to other emerging actors, as this policy extends beyond politics and economy fields (Ozkan, 2013: 48).

3.4.5. Educational Relations

In the past years there has been an increase in the number of students from Sub-Saharan Africa countries into the Turkish universities to study at various discipline, some through the initiative of Turkish government on itself, through intergovernmental exchanges of scholarship, through their own government scholarship and some based on the arrangements with the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) which usually sponsors Muslim students into the Turkish universities. The Turkish government provides a number of scholarships to the Sub-Saharan Africa students and base on bilateral agreement between Turkey and Sub-Saharan country such as Somalia (Bakari, 2005:3).

When Erdogan visited Somalia the Turkish government announced 500 scholarships for the Somalian students, the highest number ever the Turkish state has offered, to study their higher education in Turkish universities. The same also apply to the whole of Sub-Saharan Africa countries where each year Turkey offered hundred scholarships for graduate and undergraduate level. These students have been required to acquire speaking, reading and writing competence in the Turkish language in their first year of study to enable them to integrate and function fully within the Turkish society (Ali, 211:68). Additionally, there are also many students that came through the Turkish established schools in the Sub-Saharan countries. These colleges are founded and administered by Gulen movement (*Hizmet*) in the region.

Furthermore, the Ankara University has established the first African Research and Implementation Centre (ACAUM) of Turkey on 3 December 2008. This centre is contributing in better understanding of Africa by its monthly bulletin as African agenda. However, more importantly, the university started a Master program named African Studies so as to get the African continent in the academic life more involved. It is aimed that Turkey will get to know Africa by Africa itself not by Western powers and Africa will know Turkey as well.

Conclusion

The fine tune of Turkey and Sub-Saharan Africa relations will continue to flourish in as much as both sides remained committed in the developing and strengthening of their ties. The Turkish government under the AKP saw new foreign policy changes that took it to far away territories which were not considered before the AKP like Sub-Saharan Africa. The Turkish foreign policy ambition to become global power will not be fulfilled without deeply engaging in the previously neglected regions like the Sub-Saharan Africa.

A closer look at the Turkey and Sub-Saharan Africa relations both sides benefits in one way or the other, given the special place of geopolitics in Turkish foreign policy whose fundamentals can be discerned in the seminal work of the Foreign Minister Davutoglu entitled "Strategic Depth". Needless to say, the geostrategic place in Sub-Saharan Africa would not escape out of the agenda of Turkish foreign relations to the region. Turkey will therefore, continue to maintain and develop stronger ties with the countries in the Horn of Africa especially Somalia so that Turkey could have access to the Gulf of Aden for its economic trade with other part of the world.

In addition, neither Turkey nor Sub-Sahara African countries shows a sign of retreat in their relation. In the foreseeable future there will be no sign of this; this is due to the fact that Sub-Saharan countries are desperately looking for investment while Turkey is looking for additional markets for its products. In the same vein, the activities of the business organization are gaining more ground in the Turkish foreign policy thereby yielding fruitful results.

Compared to other global powers/players Turkey is not disadvantaged by having a colonial past on the region and this will continue to be an important opportunity for its image in the days to come, especially if Turkey continues to engage in win-win policies that will give due

consideration on assisting those countries in building their countries, by transfer of information technology especially on the mechanize agriculture which is the backbone of many countries of the region, by taking off its eyes from the region's mineral resources. This initiative will take Turkey toward stronger relation than that with the Western countries.

The political vision of the AKP will continue to cover Sub-Sahara African countries. We are in the system whereby the number of political allies will to certain extent determine countries' influence in the international environment. Turkey has the vision to become a global power and to have a major role to play in the United Nations policy making and this will not be realized without being a member in the United Nations Security Council as it had been tested in the past. Now that Turkey want to be elected again into the Council, it will continue to forge political relations with countries of the region at least in the short run to secure their vote while in the long run to have their political support on any conflictual issue like Cyprus.

As the Turkish economy grows, the Sub-Sahara African countries will be targeted for trade and investment, especially in the group of countries that are continuously looking for foreign investors which will help in reviving and developing their economy, provide employment opportunities and increase in the gross domestic product. Therefore, the more Turkish economy continue to grow the more Turkey would be strengthening its economic relations with Sub-Saharan Africa and the more those countries would be willing to engage in economic relations with Turkey for investment gains.

The world today is experiencing security related problems that need collective effort to resolve or manage them. The pirate activities, terrorism, international migration and civil war and many ethno-religious conflicts are disturbing some Sub-Sahara African countries. Turkey will continue to contribute to the United Nations peacekeeping operations in some of these

countries that are bedevilled with crises and activities of piracy at the Horn of Africa. It will do so because it wants to be recognized as contributor in providing and restoring peace not only in its close neighbourhood but in distant territories. Its ongoing mediation effort on some conflict in the region has proved how it is committed in the long run to participate in managing region's disturbing conflicts.

However, like many other relations bilateral or multilateral between countries, Turkey and Sub-Saharan Africa relations are associated with number of problems and challenges that hinders the attainment of its full potentials. Of course, dedication and commitment of the parties involved could overcome or manage some of these problems and challenges. Despite reaching an appreciable level in Turkey and Sub-Saharan Africa relation, the most persistent problems is lack of information on both sides about each other. The level of the awareness with regards to Sub-Saharan Africa is very low in Turkey. However, thanks to the flow of students from the region the gap has been covered at least in terms of mutual societal acknowledge. Cooperation between Turkish think thanks, promoting student exchanges and academic contacts between universities will create a level of awareness that is needed on both sides.

When compared to China and traditional Western countries, Turkey is a newcomer in terms of developing economic and political ties with the region, and it is not in their level in terms of economic development and potential to entice as many countries as they did in the Sub-Saharan Africa. With considerable financial resources China and the Western countries especially the United States, Britain, and France positioned themselves as a reliable source of funding for large development projects. China in particular exports relatively cheaper products to those countries which Turkish product could not compete with. Therefore, it would be difficult for Turkey in the short term to compete in the markets that China has already established itself.

In Somalia Turkish citizens suffered a terrorist attack in 2012 and the Al Qaeda link group Al-Shabab has continued to threaten Turkish humanitarian aids activities. The Islamist Al-Shabab has denounced Turkey's involvement as a ''cover for the Western invaders'' and has targeted Turkish interests. A suicide truck bomber killed 72 people when students gathered applying for Turkish scholarship. Again two month later a car bomb blew up meters away from newly reopened Turkish embassy in Mogadishu. This clearly means Turkey need to be more cautious in this war-ravaged country. On the other side, if Turkey is fully determined and encouraged to continue working for the sake of Somali people, it can withstand this threat from the Al-Shabab.

Another main concern of Turkey's relations towards Sub-Saharan Africa is that the question of whether Turkey is ready and committed to develop a consistent foreign policy to the region in case the AKP is no longer on power. When one looks at the historical trends of Turkish foreign policy towards the region, it is characterized by inconsistency because Turkey turned to the region only when it had problems with its traditional allies. This is due to the fact that the AKP predecessors did not consider the importance of the region in Turkish foreign policy and only AKP put into operation a strategy as a result of its new vision of multifaceted and diversified foreign policy.

The AKP-Gulen movement rift could be considered as a newly-arrived-problem in Turkey and Sub-Saharan Africa relations. In many countries of the region they worked together for the purpose of developing ties between Turkey and the country in question. As we made mention in some of the countries Gulen inspired schools paved the way for Turkish state to forge political and economic ties. With recent conflict between Gulen movement and AKP led administration the Turkey and Sub-Saharan Africa relations would not be completely unaffected and only time can prove, how far does this friction between the relevant parties could affect Turkey and Sub-Saharan Africa ties.

A careful analysis of Turkey's foreign policy towards Sub-Saharan Africa under the AKP in light of the existing relations revealed that, there is no single factor that can explain the reason and motive for this engagement. The emerging multidimensional and diversified foreign policy pursued by AKP administration provided the basis and theoretical ground for the opening to Sub-Sahara Africa. This is supported by the vision and total commitment of Turkey's Foreign Minister Davutoglu in the realisation of the tenets of the doctrine of Strategic Depth, which tailored Turkey a global power role rather than the regional because of its potential.

In addition, the Turkey's domestic factors and transformation also yielded and contributed significantly in the acceleration and developing Turkish ties with Sub-Saharan Africa. The prospect of the relations seems dependent on the sustenance of the established vision and vigour in the Turkish side to maintain the pace and extent of its diplomatic, political and cultural relations with the region. Of course, after AKP Turkey will continue to acclaim a global role, and the future governments will also not afford losing benefits that they can extract from such a dynamically growing market in the region. It must also be underlined that Turkey, which sees its global political prowess in membership in the leading international organizations like the UN will continue to retain close bonds with the regional countries to secure their support in the General Assembly. Since when engaged with the region, Turkey has become an indispensable player of the Sub-Saharan African politics and it seems it has to remain so in the decades to come.

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